• Response to Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Article on Iran’s Short Timeline to a Bomb

    Iran can build a crude nuclear weapon too quickly, in about six months, after a decision to do so, but the regime risks being detected early after its decision to do so and all along its subsequent pathway to a bomb. That time is more than sufficient for a devastating military response by Israel, hopefully supported by the United States and other allies.

  • How Russia Neutralized Ukraine’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons

    When Ukraine declared its independence from the U.S.S.R in August 1991., Kyiv came into possession of the third largest nuclear weapons stockpile in the world, after the Soviet Union and the United States.Anestimated 2,800-4,200 tactical nuclear weapons were relinquished to Russia in a move that may have changed the course of history.

  • Japanese Yakuza Leader Pleads Guilty to Nuclear Materials Trafficking

    Takeshi Ebisawa, 60, of Japan, pleaded guilty in Manhattan, New York, the other day to conspiring with a network of associates to traffic nuclear materials, including uranium and weapons-grade plutonium, from Burma to other countries.

  • China Now Has More Than 600 Nuclear Warheads, Pentagon Says

    The stockpiling reflects a changing attitude toward nuclear weapons among Chinese military planners, report says.

  • Taleghan 2: Pre- and Post Strike Assessment

    On October 25, 2024, Israel launched an attack on Iran that destroyed multiple buildings within the Parchin Military Complex. One target stood out–a building used for nuclear weapons development purposes under Iran’s Amad Plan in the early 2000s.

  • Iran Increases Enrichment Activities to Dangerous Levels: IAEA

    The most recent IAEA report sounded an alarm about a dangerous increase in Iran’s enrichment activities at the Fordow enrichment plant. No longer constrained by the 2015 nuclear deal, from which the Trump administration unilaterally withdrew in 2018, Iran can now decide to produce10-15 kg of weapon grade uranium (WGU) per month, an annual rate of 120 to 130 kg WGU per year, enough for about five nuclear weapons. Iran could supplement this at any point by using its existing stock of 60 percent highly enriched uranium (HEU).

  • New Centrifuge Spins Lasting Partnership

    Sandia’s Weapons Evaluation Test Laboratory (WETL) is DOE’s only laboratory with two centrifuges that support full system-level testing. WETL is responsible for performing nonnuclear testing and evaluation of every weapon system in the U.S. nuclear arsenal.

  • Stopping the Bomb

    When one country learns that another country is trying to make a nuclear weapon, what options does it have to stop the other country from achieving that goal? While the query may be straightforward, answers are anything but. One scholar identifies a suite of strategies states use to prevent other nations from developing nuclear weapons.

  • The History of WIPP

    In 1975, the nation asked Sandia to investigate the possibility of building a repository in New Mexico for the disposal of radioactive transuranic defense waste. Little did those assigned to the project know that the task would absorb most of their careers and become one of the most controversial and important projects in U.S. history.

  • NNSA Completes and Diamond-Stamps First Plutonium Pit for W87-1 Warhead

    During the Cold War, the United States could manufacture hundreds of plutonium pits per year. Pit production ceased in 1989, and NNSA continues to recapitalize production capabilities that atrophied in the post-Cold War era.

  • The Unthinkable: What Nuclear War in Europe Would Look Like

    If Russia were to launch a massive nuclear strike on Ukraine or Western Europe, there is not much the continent could do to stop it. NATO’s internal calculations reportedly predict that in the event of an all-out attack from Russia, the military bloc has “less than 5 percent” of the air defenses needed.

  • The World Isn’t Taking Putin’s Nuclear Threats Seriously – the History of Propaganda Suggests I Should

    Vladimir Putin has spoken several times about using nuclear weapons since Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. To believe that Putin is not serious about using nuclear weapons is a dangerous assumption to make.

  • North Korea Explained: What Americans Need to Know

    The Korean Peninsula, with its intricate web of historical tensions, nuclear threats, and geopolitical dynamics, will demand a nuanced and strategic approach from the incoming administration.

  • How to Manage Escalation with Nuclear Adversaries Like China

    Chinese leaders fled Beijing in October 1969, as a nuclear attack from the Soviet Union seemed imminent. They were on the precipice of nuclear war owing to a remarkable series of missteps and miscommunications. The crisis of 1969 holds some important lessons for U.S. military planners as they think through how a future war with China could unfold. It needs a theory of victory that explains not just how it plans to win, but how it plans to win without triggering a nuclear war.

  • Missile Test Helps Launch Mk21 Fuze into U.S. Nuclear Stockpile

    The June test launch of a Minuteman III from Vandenberg Space Force Base in California was the last in a series of planned activities designed to demonstrate the operational effectiveness of the Mk21 Fuze, providing proof to the U.S. Air Force that it is ready to be accepted into the U.S. nuclear stockpile.