• Iranian Breakout Timelines Under JCPOA-Type Limits

    The 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA) made it impossible for Iran, if it withdrew from the deal, to produce enough weapon-grade uranium (WGU) for a nuclear weapon in less than 12 months. The U.S unilateral withdrawal from JCPOA in 2018 has changed the situation so fundamentally in favor of Iran and its nuclear weapons program, that new limits are needed, the most important of which is that Iran destroy centrifuges and related equipment, rather than store them. A focus on only limiting enriched uranium stocks will not provide sufficient breakout timelines.

  • Operation Opera Redux? Iran’s Nuclear Program and the Preventive War Paradox

    The 1981 Israeli destruction of Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor was an operational success, but is regarded by many as a strategic failure. Scholars call this the preventive war paradox: compromising one’s security in the long term through military action that is operationally successful.

  • What We’ve Learned from Survivors of the Atomic Bombs

    Q&A with Dr. Preetha Rajaraman, New Vice Chair for the Radiation Effects Research Foundation in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan.

  • Showdown in the Middle East

    In 2018, President Trump abandoned the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, claiming that Obama’s deal wasn’t good enough and that he would get a better one by imposing “maximum pressure.” As was predicted in 2018, the Iranian response to the U.S. campaign of maximum pressure was not to offer the Americans more, but instead to press ahead with enriching Uranium to the point where they are now close to having enough to build some nuclear weapons should they choose to do so. Can a new round of negotiations, or military action, stop Iran getting a nuclear weapon?

  • Where the U.S.-Iran Nuclear Talks Are Headed

    The Iranian position remains that the talks should focus on the nuclear issue and sanctions relief, with Iran repeatedly stating that its nuclear program is only intended for peaceful purposes. Trump has said that he only wants assurances that Iran does not produce nuclear weapons. Thus, issues such as Iran’s support for regional proxies and its missile program could be off the table.

  • How and Where Is Nuclear waste stored in the U.S.?

    Around the U.S., about 90,000 tons of nuclear waste is stored at over 100 sites in 39 states, in a range of different structures and containers. For decades, the nation has been trying to send it all to one secure location. Perhaps there will be a temporary site whose location passes muster with the Supreme Court. But in the meantime, the waste will stay where it is.

  • Can Europe Defend Itself Against a Nuclear-Armed Russia?

    National security expert details what’s being done, what can be done as U.S. appears to rethink decades-long support. Regarding the U.S. nuclear umbrella, which has covered Europe since the 1950s, Richard Hooker says: “Is it reliable? I wouldn’t think so. If Putin were to threaten or actually use tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine or, let’s say in Estonia, would the administration respond with nuclear threats of its own? Personally, I have my doubts.”

  • Negotiating a New Iran Nuclear Deal

    In August 2019, the Institute for Science and International Security produced astudy at the request of the administration for an internal discussion. It is not the current administration’s or the Institute’s position, although the Institute supports the general thrust, especially the need to go beyond JCPOA limits and for Iran to provide the IAEA a verified complete nuclear declaration.

  • French Nuclear Deterrence for Europe: How Effective Could It Be Against Russia?

    Does France have the capacity to defend Europe? Would the deployment of the French nuclear umbrella in Eastern Europe make Europe strategically autonomous, giving it the means to defend itself independently?

  • B61-12 System Production Ends, Sustainment Begins

    A nuclear weapon milestone: in December, Sandia Lab has completed the last production unit of the B61-12 nuclear gravity bomb.

  • Can Israel Destroy Iran's Nuclear Program?

    U.S. intelligence has concluded that the odds of an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear program in the next few months are high, but the jury is out on whether Israel can destroy its archfoe’s nuclear facilities on its own.

  • Response to Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Article on Iran’s Short Timeline to a Bomb

    Iran can build a crude nuclear weapon too quickly, in about six months, after a decision to do so, but the regime risks being detected early after its decision to do so and all along its subsequent pathway to a bomb. That time is more than sufficient for a devastating military response by Israel, hopefully supported by the United States and other allies.

  • How Russia Neutralized Ukraine’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons

    When Ukraine declared its independence from the U.S.S.R in August 1991., Kyiv came into possession of the third largest nuclear weapons stockpile in the world, after the Soviet Union and the United States.Anestimated 2,800-4,200 tactical nuclear weapons were relinquished to Russia in a move that may have changed the course of history.

  • Japanese Yakuza Leader Pleads Guilty to Nuclear Materials Trafficking

    Takeshi Ebisawa, 60, of Japan, pleaded guilty in Manhattan, New York, the other day to conspiring with a network of associates to traffic nuclear materials, including uranium and weapons-grade plutonium, from Burma to other countries.

  • China Now Has More Than 600 Nuclear Warheads, Pentagon Says

    The stockpiling reflects a changing attitude toward nuclear weapons among Chinese military planners, report says.