CLOAK & DAGGERNuclear Scientists Have Long Been Targets in Covert Ops – Israel Has Brought That Policy Out of the Shadows
Since 1944, there have been at least 100 instances of what researchers call nuclear “scientist targeting.” The most recent example are the 14 senior Iranian nuclear scientists Israel killed on 13 June as part of the opening move of its surprise attack on Iran, in which Israel has also decapitated the Iranian military, intelligence services, and Revolutionary Guard by killing practically all of these organizations’ leaders and senior officers – several dozen in all. In the week since the attack was launched, Israel has killed three more Iranian nuclear scientists.
At least 14 nuclear scientists are believed to be among those killed in Israel’s Operation Rising Lion, launched on June 13, 2025, ostensibly to destroy or degrade Iran’s nuclear program and military capabilities.
Deliberately targeting scientists in this way aims to disrupt Iran’s knowledge base and continuity in nuclear expertise. Among those assassinated were Mohammad Mehdi Tehranchi, a theoretical physicist and head of Iran’s Islamic Azad University, and Fereydoun Abbasi-Davani, a nuclear engineer who led Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization.
Collectively, these experts in physics and engineering were potential successors to Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, widely regarded as the architect of the Iranian nuclear program, who was assassinated in a November 2020 attack many blame on Israel.
As two political scientists writing a book about state targeting of scientists as a counterproliferation tool, we understand well that nuclear scientists have been targeted since the nuclear age began. We have gathered data on nearly 100 instances of what we call “scientist targeting” from 1944 through 2025.
The most recent assassination campaign against Iranian scientists is different from many of the earlier episodes in a few key ways. Israel’s recent attack targeted multiple nuclear experts and took place simultaneously with military force to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities, air defenses and energy infrastructure. Also, unlike previous covert operations, Israel immediately claimed responsibility for the assassinations.
But our research indicates that targeting scientists may not be effective for counterproliferation. While removing individual expertise may delay nuclear acquisition, targeting alone is unlikely to destroy a program outright and could even increase a country’s desire for nuclear weapons. Further, targeting scientists may trigger blowback given concerns regarding legality and morality.
