Lessons learned: Cheech and Chong at the Y-12 security breach

the breach,” the vaunted security system looks as it Cheech and Chong built the system from scratch.  And maintained it, operated it, and wrote the self-aggrandizing evaluation reports of it.  The same Cheeches and Chongs were literally asleep at the wheel in the early morning hours during which Sister Megan and her confederates broke through countless layers of security in what the Y-12 Web site describes as the, “…most stringent security in the world.”

This report summarizes that, “… we identified troubling displays of ineptitude in responding to alarms, failures, to maintain critical security equipment, over reliance on compensatory measures, misunderstanding of security protocols, poor communications, and weaknesses in contract and resource management.  Contract governance and Federal oversight failed to identify and correct early indicators of these multiple system breakdowns.” 

But that is just the tip of this security nightmare/farce in which the blame is initially leveled at those least responsible, the guards.  Gradually and reluctantly, the report, by way of endless bureaucratic obfuscation, jargon, and slight-of-hand choice of the passive voice, documents that the responsibility also rests with the plant manager, the management contractor, a subsidiary of Babcock & Wilcox , and the various levels of federal bureaucracy which continued to ignore serious security problems even though the security system was, at least on paper, infused with enormous fiscal resources.

I must admit that in my previous HSNW column, based upon the then-known facts of this case (see William J. Broad, “The Nun Who Broke Into the Nuclear Sanctum,”  New York Times, 11 August 2012, p. 1A; and AP’s Erik Schelzig, “New Charges Filed in Nuclear Weapons Plant Breach,” Yahoo!News, 9 August 2012), I grossly underestimated the level of security incompetency and mismanagement at Y-12.

What we have in this heavily sanitized and vetted self-report — after the jargon and post-facto rationalizations and justifications are swept away — is more or less the following set of problematic circumstances:

1. The surveillance cameras did not work because they had been broken for weeks or months and there was no enforced policy in place to maintain them when inoperable
2. The three suspects had to turn themselves in because, after three hours, not a single guard at Y-12 knew they had broken through three security fences, cameras, and other security devices
3. In addition to the security equipment identified, there was other classified equipment that also did not work or was not properly maintained or operated
4. The security contractor, which is a subsidiary of the corporation that built the security system, stands accused of a large number of  security lapses and “proceedings” against them have been initiated
5. Federal oversight, the so-called “governance model,” failed at multiple levels, including self-reports characterizing the security system as satisfactory even though there was a serious “communications” problem inherent in the “governance model” and between the “governance model” and contract management
6. One type of surveillance camera utilized was not suited for this particular security task, but the on-going problem was never rectified

The report provides eight different ways in which additional actions should be taken, from verifying that Y-12 security equipment is “repaired and operational” to “a lessons learned report” to be shared by all those at Y-12.  “Lessons learned?”

While specific guards, guard supervisors, and the plant manager have been fired, what of the vaunted “governance model” that was in place at Y-12?  This “governance model,” management-speak for all the officials — none of whom is named — who share responsibility for this mindboggling revelation of a security disaster in the making. 

Last week marked the eleventh year since the events of 9/11, events which triggered significant investment in our national security. This report by the Inspector General of the Department of Energy suggests that while much has been accomplished throughout our country, there are breathtaking lapses at Y-12 which must be closely examined not only by those federal officials who are in charge, but by Congress.  In the end, this very troubling report documents the need to continue asking questions about why and how a Cheech and Chong security culture prevailed at Y-12 until 28 July 2012.  In contrast to the standards established by the “governance model” in place at Y-12, a management model which miserably failed, Y-12’s system must be truly fixed not just on bureaucratic paper but in reality.  Our nation’s security requires nothing less.

Robert Lee Maril, a professor of sociology at East Carolina University and founding director of the Center for Diversity and Inequality Research, is the author of The Fence: National Security, Public Safety, and Illegal Immigration along the U.S.-Mexico Border. He blogs at leemaril.com.