IranCan Iran’s rulers still use enemies abroad to rally nation?
The rulers of the Islamic Republic of Iran have routinely used external conflicts to divert public attention from domestic problems, deflect attacks, promote national cohesion, and repress their opponents. Democratic activists in Iran may hope that the signing of the international nuclear deal will curb the country’s regime from further militarizing the state and repressing the opposition, but it is more likely that Iran’s leadership will continue their contentious pattern, and continue their anti-American and anti-Israeli rhetoric. With the nuclear agreement or without it, the theocracy’s history suggests that its leaders are more likely to focus on external conflicts in order to shore up their power base, deflect attacks, divert attention from unresolved internal problems and repress demands for democracy.
Dartmouth professor Mirsagh Parsa // Source: dartmouth.edu
The rulers of the Islamic Republic of Iran have routinely used external conflicts to divert public attention from domestic problems, deflect attacks, promote national cohesion, and repress their opponents.
As someone who has studied Iran’s political development and conflicts for close to four decades, I would argue that much of the tension between Iran and the United States over the past 40-odd years, including the current nuclear dispute with the international community, can be seen in this light.
Democratic activists in Iran may hope that the signing of the international nuclear deal will curb the country’s regime from further militarizing the state and repressing the opposition, but I argue that it is more likely that Iran’s leadership will continue their contentious pattern.
Shia clerics and the CIA on the same side?
Some may think that the origins of the clergy’s opposition to the United States date back to 1953 when a CIA-backed coup removed the liberal, democratic government of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh from power. That is not the case, however, as the archives show.
While the majority of Iranians supported the democratic government and opposed the coup, some of the highest Shiite religious leaders in Iran welcomed Mosaddegh’s ouster.
Conservative religious leaders viewed Mosaddegh as too liberal and secular because he refused to ban the sale of alcohol and did not oppose women’s right to vote. What is more, he promoted agrarian reforms that increased the income of the peasants in Iran’s sharecropping system and therefore undermined the interest of some of the landed clergy.
Leading cleric Ayatollah Behbahani, for example, played an active role in the overthrow of the prime minister. He actually distributed American money among conspirators, which became known as Behbahani dollars.
When the coup first failed and the Shah (or the king of Iran) who had (after initial reluctance) ordered the coup fled the country on August 16 1953, Ayatollah Boroujerdi, the highest religious leader in the country, sent a telegram to the Shah asking him to return to the country because “Shiism and Islam need you.”
Ayatollah Khomeini, who would end up the leader of the revolution against the Shah in 1979, also made clear his dislike of the prime minister: Mosaddegh was not Muslim and had he stayed in power, he would have slapped Islam.
When the coup finally did succeed in removing Mosaddegh from power, conservative clerics were delighted to welcome back the Shah and his
