CBP MSC vehicle contracts to Telephonic appear problematic
In effect, Borkowski’s post-SBInet strategy is to chop the failed SBInet program into its component parts and pieces, then award contracts to a new group of government contractors to provide these products. Boeing, Inc., was the primary contractor for the failed SBInet. Borkowski, the senior CBP executive of the SBInet program from 2006 to 2010, was promoted in 2010 to lead the OTIA.
After five years of SBInet, and now an additional five years of Borkowski’s post-SBInet contract strategy, the clock continues ticking along the Mexican border.
The U.S. Border Patrol, in fact, has been waiting for almost three decades for state of the art, integrated surveillance equipment, technologies that, unlike SBInet, actually function on a daily basis and with a high degree of operationality based upon quality of the product. These new surveillance technologies promised along the Mexican not only increase efficiency among border guards, but also reduce risk to law enforcement officers and provide measurable benefits to both border crossers as well as border residents. Oddly, a good portion of this same surveillance technology is already utilized by law enforcement in other countries.
—————————————————————————————————————-
Read also:
Robert Lee Maril, “The real cost of CBP’s failed SBInet is $1.389 billion,” HSNW 7 March 2016
Robert Lee Maril, “Fixing failed SBInet: Contract delays, quality issues at CBP,” HSNW, 9 February 2016
Robert Lee Maril, “How many times does CBP’s Mark Borkowski get to fail?” HSNW, 28 September 2015
—————————————————————————————————————-
Federal government documents show that on 30 December 20110, U.S. Customs and Border Protection awarded Telephonics Corporation a $45 million contract to build MSC vehicles (Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation ). The Telephonics’ MSC contract number is HSBP1011C00025. This relatively simple surveillance technology package is mounted atop all-terrain trucks and includes a telescopic component rising over twenty-five feet from the truck bed. Regardless of the relatively basic design and functions of MSC vehicles, MSC vehicles are far superior to previous generations of surveillance vehicles with similar objectives. In the past agents have been forced to use cast off, antiquated military surveillance equipment that is both far less mobile and much more fragile than currently existing surveillance technologies. (Robert Lee Maril, Patrolling Chaos: The U.S. Border Patrol in Deep South Texas [Texas Tech University Press, 2012]).
CBP paid an action obligation of $12,891,783 to Telephonics on 30 December 2010 after awarding this corporation a part of the total MSC vehicle contract (ICX Tactical Platforms Corporation also received a MSC vehicle contract on 30 December 2010). Presumably this initial funding was to begin full production of Telephonics’ MSC vehicles and/or crucial vehicle components.
In fact, by 30 December 2010 two MSC units had already been built by Telephonics for field tests conducted by CBP as part of the acquisition process required of all contract bidders. These two Telephonics MSC units presumably met specifications and requirements at that time as outlined in the CBP’s MSC proposal to all contractors. Otherwise, one must assume that Telephonics would not have been awarded the contract by CBP and OTIA.
Then suddenly and without any public explanation, on 10 July 2013, more than two and one-half years after CBP awarded a MSC vehicles contract to Telephonics, government documents show that CBP decided to “terminate for cause” the MSC contract it awarded to Telephonics in 2010 (Federal Procurement Data System, 29 April 2016)
Shortly thereafter, according to federal government documents, CBP took back $11,877,039 from Telephonics of the $12,891,783 action obligation CBP provided Telephonics on 30 December 2010.
“Termination for cause” is defined as the, “right of project owner or contractor to partially or totally terminate a contract under the provisions of a termination clause” (The Law Dictionary).
“Terminate for cause” may be a special or unique term used by CBP in place of the more commonly used legal term “terminate for default”. According to federal government acquisition procedures, termination for default is, “…generally the exercise of the Government’s contractual right to completely or partially terminate a contract because of the contractor’s actual or anticipated failure to perform its contractual obligations” (Subpart 49.4-Termination for Default, 49.401 General).
It is at this point that the CBP’s MSC contract process becomes even more contentious. Seemingly out of nowhere, on the last day of 2015 – 30 December 2015 — federal government documents show that CBP once more awarded a MSC vehicles contract to Telephonics. CBP awarded a contract obligation of $13,470,067 to Telephonics on this date.
According to a Telephonics press release three weeks after the CBP award on 30 December 2015, Telephonics stated that “, …it has been awarded a production contract from U.S. Customs and Border Protection for its Mobile Surveillance Capability (MSC) vehicles to be used by agents on the U.S. and Mexican border.”
Telephonics touts in this same press release the specific attributes and qualities of its MSC vehicle. However, Telephonics fails to mention that the MSC vehicle contract, or a contract very similar to it, that it received from CBP on the lat day of 2015 was originally awarded to it in 2010. No mention is made, moreover, that Telephonics received a “terminate for cause” from CBP on this same contract, or one very similar to it, in 2013.
Equally odd is that, according to Telephonics, “…CBP has been operating two Telephonics’ MSC vehicles on the southwest border for over nine months, as part of an Operational Utility Evaluation (OUE)”(“Telephonics Mobile Surveillance Capability Chosen by US Customs and Border Protection”.)
OUEs are normally required when a contractor bids for a specific contract and subsequently CBP field-tests the quality and utility of the product before the contract is awarded. CBP’s intent in originally fielding testing the MSC vehicles prior to awarding the MSC contract in 2010 was presumably to measure capabilities of the test vehicles relative to the expectations and specifications detailed in its proposal to multiple contractors. These required field tests sometimes take a week to conduct and are, according to contractors, very demanding.
The preproduction costs of these test units are high and there is no guarantee that competing contractors can necessarily recoup their financial losses in producing two test units if they are not awarded the final CBP contract. The initial production cost of these two units, while a financial risk, is only reasonable when compared to the possible profits to be made should a contractor actually receive the CBP contract award.
Are these two MSC units tested for nine months on the southwest border by CBP the same units tested by CBP in 2010? Or are these vehicles brand new Telephonics MSC units with additional surveillance capabilities or features not present in the 2010 test vehicles? If the later is the case, why would Telephonics, even though it had no formal contract with CBP, willingly risk financial loss yet again after already losing a $45 million federal contract? Why would CBP award a second contract to Telephonics after Telephonics, according to federal government documents, was terminated for cause by CBP in 2013?
These and many other related questions remain unanswered but, based upon government documents, highlight what appear to be puzzling inconsistencies in CBP and OTIA’s acquisition process of surveillance technologies targeted for the Mexican border.
A spokesperson for Telephonics declined by email to answer any questions about the newest MSC vehicle contract awarded by CBP on the last day of 2015. Telephonics also declined to answer any questions about the details of their own press release announcing the new MSC contract they were awarded by CBP. This included questions directly addressing the history of Telephonics MSC vehicle contract in 2010 and their termination for cause of the contract Telephonics was awarded by CBP in 2013.
In sharp contrast to Telephonics, no federal government documents as yet available suggest that ICX Tactical Platforms Corporation, the other awardee of the MSC contract, has any contractual problems with their original MSC contract with CBP still in place. Awarded its MSC vehicles contract by OTIA at the same time as Telephonics Corporation in 2010, ICX has received $76,393,831.73 in contract obligations from CBP as of 18 January 2016. ICX’s contract number is HSBP1011C00024. CBP contract obligations from 2010 to the first month of 2106 demonstrate that ICX, to the satisfaction of CBP and OTIA, is fulfilling its contractual agreements with regard to the MSC vehicle production process and, as well, is meeting expectations, standards, and other contractual specifications.
Unfortunately, the unintended consequences of these documented problematic delays in the CBP and OTIAA acquisition process with Telephonics MSC vehicle contracts have serious ramifications. Equally troubling is that CBP MSC contract delays from 2010 to 2015 mirror SBInet delays from 2006 to 2011. Moreover, these contract delays with Telephonics MSC vehicles, a surveillance technology already in place in other countries, continues to create a U.S.-Mexican border far less secure or safe than it should or has to be.
Robert Lee Maril is the author of The Fence: National Security, Public Safety, and Illegal Immigration along the U.S.–Mexico Border. He blogs at leemaril.com.
