Special forces should be at the heart of Britain’s military planning

By analyzing the tactics of these quasi-military, quasi-terrorist cells, it is possible to identify tactics and therefore the sort of troops best suited for countering them. The careful attack that removes the head of the snake is probably the most productive.

The effectiveness of special forces can be illustrated by the successful rescue of five members of the Royal Irish Regiment who had been held by a militia group known as the “West Side Boys” in Sierra Leone. Operation Barras, took place on 19 September 2000, in a dawn assault on the West Side Boys’ base.

The direct assault was conducted by the British Special Air Service, with elements of the Parachute Regiment (also, to be noted, specialist troops if not technically Special Forces) launching a diversionary assault. All five soldiers as well as twenty-one Sierra Leone civilians who had been held prisoner were freed unharmed. At least twenty-five West Side Boys were killed in the assault and eighteen captured, including the gang’s leader. One British soldier was killed.

Changing focus
An increasing concentration on special forces-type troops requires a wider realignment of our military. Such troops need to be selected from a base of potential candidates most likely found in the United Kingdom in the light infantry and specialized units such as the Parachute Regiment and Royal Marines. In turn, this suggests both an expansion of such forces and a greater allocation of resources. Logistics, communication and especially transport (any bids for buying the Osprey anyone?) would also require examination.

But it is with intelligence that the second focus would be required. Intelligence remains the key to success with such small-scale operations, especially in firepower. Intelligence-gathering is becoming increasingly sophisticated, technical and therefore both specialized and expensive.

Technical data-gathering has become ever easier and more pervasive, especially with the development of both satellites and unmanned air vehicles (or drones). But the ability to sweep up vast quantities of information means little without the capacity to analyze it – and herein lies the third area that would require significant investment if we were to adopt a more specialized approach to warfare.

And the world of drones, already with their ability to loiter for prolonged periods at low cost, all but zero risk to the attacker and increasing ubiquity, has ushered in a form of war fighting that would have seemed extraordinary only a generation ago. Drones can, of course, also be used as attack platforms, and the coming together of precision weapons, long-endurance platforms and low-risk operations dovetail neatly within this broader form of special, and specialized, operations.

In many ways, Voltaire was right: it is no longer the size of your arsenal of firepower but how well it is employed that matters. Organizations such as Islamic State understand that well: their actions are carefully targeted to achieve maximum effect with limited resources. With technology on the Western side, the best counter to this present – and likely future – threat, will be to adopt in turn Voltaire’s maxim and concentrate increasingly on special, and specialized, forces.

Ian Shields is Associate Lecturer in International Relations, Anglia Ruskin University. This article is published courtesy of The Conversation (under Creative Commons-Attribution / No derivative).