Russia's influence is much more than propaganda and fake news
This liberal bias has led the majority of Russia-commentators to miss something that is in plain sight: that Russia’s conservative values are increasingly attractive among populist groups in the West, and that this attraction is doing what soft power is supposed to do: generating support for Russia’s foreign policy.
As we have argued at length elsewhere, the ideological attraction of the values put forward by the Russian regime cross several categories, including moral conservatism, illiberal governance, and strong leadership. These have found resonance among a diverse group of Western political elites, all of whom praise Russia as a leader in this issue area.
For instance, Marine Le Pen, leader of France’s Front National, argued that she and Putin defend ‘”common values,” particularly the “Christian heritage” of Europe. Many Western populist political elites have openly praised Putin for his strong leadership style, including UKIP’s Nigel Farage, Steve Bannon, the former chief strategist for President Trump and the U.S. president himself. In fact, a 2016 survey conducted by the European Council on Foreign Relations found that all 41 representatives of European anti-establishment parties, on both the right and the left, were sympathetic to Vladimir Putin’s Russia.
This attraction to the conservative ideological values put forward by the Russian government does what soft power is supposed to do: granting legitimacy and moral authority to foreign policy. When the European Union decided to sanction Russia over the annexation of Crimea, populist political elites who had previously pointed to Russia with admiration opposed this decision. When Russia decided to get militarily involved in Syria, these same populist elites supported Russia’s decision.
Russia’s soft power among these populist groups is important to recognize because it means that Russian influence is not just about propaganda and disinformation: it is also about ideological attraction among a growing and influential constituency within the West.
This is significant for two reasons. First, it means that Russian propaganda is not simply being delivered to a uniform audience that needs to be convinced or confused: it is being delivered to a differentiated audience, some of whom will buy into the messages put out by the Russian regime because it conforms with their ideological values.
Second, it means that countering Russian influence in the West is not simply a matter of fact-checking to counter the propaganda efforts. This will not be effective among populists who have bought into the Russian message. These people are not confused, they have not misunderstood the issues, nor are they simply “useful idiots” for the Russian state. They believe that the conservative values put forward by the Russian regime are also their values. The problem is therefore not one of access to the “right” information: it is fundamentally ideological.
This is by no means a passive audience – Western populist groups are forging ties with Russia and with each other. They believe these are values worth defending. Therefore, while we acknowledge the useful work done to understand how Russian propaganda and disinformation strategies function, if we wish to effectively counter Russian influence operations, we need to understand that the problem is potentially deeper than this, and requires a strategy that takes this ideological attraction into consideration.
Read the article: Vincent Charles Keating and Katarzyna Kaczmarska, “Russia’s influence is much more than propaganda and fake news,” Euronews (4 April 2018). Vincent Charles Keating is an Associate Professor in International Relations at the Center for War Studies, University of Southern Denmark. Katarzyna Kaczmarska is a Marie Curie Research Fellow at the Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University.
