DisinformationThe Dark Arts of Disinformation Through a Historical Lens
History matters because sometimes it repeats itself. In his pioneering analysis of modern disinformation warfare from a historical perspective, Thomas Rid posits from the outset that “only by taking careful and accurate measure of the fantastic past of disinformation can we comprehend the present, and fix the future.”
Book review: Thomas Rid, Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, April 2020)
History matters because sometimes it repeats itself. In his pioneering analysis of modern disinformation warfare from a historical perspective, Dr. Thomas Rid posits from the outset that “only by taking careful and accurate measure of the fantastic past of disinformation can we comprehend the present, and fix the future.” When a political scientist writes a history book, you should still expect, if not a mid-range theory, then at least a thesis with a normative conclusion of recommendations for policy-making or problem-solving. Rid’s timely book on the history of “active measures” by Soviet and post-Soviet Russian special services, along with those of other Eastern bloc and Western countries, is no exception. Rid writes that the merger of new technologies and the old school of strategic deception have made it “easier than ever to test, amplify, sustain and deny active measures, and harder than ever to counter or suppress rumors, lies and conspiracy theories.”
“Active Measures” offers over a dozen case studies, organized chronologically, of operations run by disinformation warriors in the past hundred years. Rid weaves the historical canvas from a vast array of primary sources, mostly from the declassified documents of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency as well as from the archives of East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, along with numerous secondary sources. If previously narratives were scattered throughout the memoirs of spymasters, the accounts of Soviet, Russian, Eastern bloc intelligence defectors and archival documents, now students of psychological warfare can find the outstanding cases in one volume, making it a “must-read,” in my view. Given Rid’s German background and that he teaches classes in information security at Johns Hopkins University, it should not be surprising that the most convex and detail-rich vignettes are about the operations of the East German Ministry for State Security (STASI; in particular, the author has drawn information from the archives of STASI’s Department X, a disinformation unit and the more recent cases of Russian hacking and data leaking intended to weaken the targeted adversaries.
