Fukushima: Ten Years On from the Disaster, Was Japan’s Response Right?
The Analysis
Our team ran a simulation of a Fukushima-style accident at a fictional reactor in southern England and showed that, most likely, only the people in the nearest village would need to move out. That means hundreds of people relocated, rather than tens of thousands. It’s difficult to argue for any relocation after the accident at Fukushima Daiichi in Japan, where the calculated loss of life expectancy from staying put in the worst-affected township, Tomioka, would have been three months – less than Londoners are currently losing to air pollution
Of course, we are not saying nothing should be done, quite the opposite. The University of Bristol researchers had developed the J-value (with “J” standing for judgement) to help arrive at objective answers for safety questions arising from nuclear plants, railways and other infrastructure that improves our lives.
How much should a nuclear power plant spend on protecting its workers? Is it cost-effective to install a new safety system for railway signaling? Should a government be spending more to prevent road deaths? The J-value balances the amount of life expectancy that a safety measure restores against its cost. And it takes the ethical stance that each day of life has the same value for everyone – whether a person is rich or poor, young or old.
In the aftermath of a nuclear accident, the J-value can help prioritize the most useful measures, like cleaning roofs and gutters in towns and cities and reducing radioactive cesium uptake in farmland by adding ferrocyn to cattle feed and replacing contaminated soil.
Why is relocating people rarely one of those? Relocations are not just expensive, they also cause difficult-to-quantify problems for evacuees which can be equally, or more, serious than remaining. The World Health Organization documented the upheaval of the Chernobyl disaster among the relocated community and found a legacy of depression and alcoholism. Across the population, a rise in suicide and substance abuse can shorten evacuees’ lives far more than might have been lost to radiation in their old homes. Similar evidence is starting to emerge from Fukushima, especially for male suicide.
A Greater Threat Looms
Japan in 2010 was arguably the world leader in civil nuclear power, having opened the first “third generation” nuclear unit at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa in 1996. Mighty conglomerates Toshiba and Hitachi were poised to deliver a nuclear renaissance worldwide. Both have since left the UK with empty spaces where new nuclear power plants were supposed to be. Hitachi’s ambitions for Taiwan (Lungmen) and the US (South Texas) also evaporated, as well as at home in Japan (Shimane). In Japan many, already built, plants remain shutdown.
There is a clear imbalance between the very low risk of a severe nuclear accident that can be expected to kill remarkably few people on the one hand, and the near certainty, on the other, of climate change threatening the futures of all the world’s species as a result of the continued burning of fossil fuels. Japan’s case illustrates the point.
Carbon-free nuclear power supplied 25% of the country’s electricity in 2010, but its share dropped to less than 1% four years after the accident. The shortfall was made up by a 30% rise in the use of coal, oil and natural gas. By 2019, fossil fuels were still providing 70% of Japan’s electricity.
Analysts report that Japan could generate almost a third of its energy from renewable sources by 2030. But decarbonizsation could have proceeded even quicker if nuclear power had not been forced from the mix. Though the reaction is understandable – trust was broken.
The sense that something must be done can be powerful amid widespread disaster. The challenge is directing it towards finding the right solutions.
William Nuttall is Professor of Energy, The Open University. Philip Thomas is Professor of Risk Management, University of Bristol. This article is published courtesy of The Conversation.
