ASIAN SECURITYHas Indonesia’s Deradicalization Program Done Enough to Combat Terrorism?

By William Frangia

As anticipated for several years, an increasing number of Indonesian prisoners convicted of terrorism-related offences are now completing their prison terms. For Indonesian authorities, this represents a particularly prickly policy challenge. At the center of this challenge is the need for a greater understanding of the efficiency and effectiveness of Indonesia’s deradicalization program and post-sentence risk assessments. The success of these programs will determine the future security of Southeast Asia.

In December last year, Indonesian authorities granted the early release of Umar Patek—the chief bombmaker for the 2002 Bali bombings—after a series of sentence reductions for good behavior. Resentment about the decision has been aired in both Indonesia and Australia. The Bali bombings remain the worst terrorist attack Australia has ever experienced.

Prison-sentence durations are often opaque in the Indonesian justice system. Patek has been held up as a model of rehabilitation by Indonesian authorities, with his reported remorse and efforts to counsel his fellow prisoners lauded as a win for Indonesia’s reform programs.

Since 2000, Indonesia has arrested around 3,000 offenders for a range of terrorism-related offences. While the government has proposed a policy of prison segregation and higher security for terrorists, overcrowding in prisons has made that virtually impossible.

At the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic, Indonesia’s prisons housed 270,000 inmates, despite having the facilities for only half that number. Rising arrests exacerbate the problem, since prisons lack the resources to supervise convicts. As a result, terrorists meant to be in isolation have mingled with hundreds of other prisoners, and riots have led to deaths and prison escapes. Overcrowding has turned Indonesia’s jails into potential ‘schools of crime’; if inmates weren’t radicalized before, they might be now.

Since 2012, Indonesia’s deradicalization program has played an integral part in its counterterrorism strategy. A series of courses facilitated by state institutions, civil-society organizations and individual prisons provide life-skills training for the post-prison world, such as financial management. They also offer theological seminars, often run by former terrorists.

Inmates can choose to participate in any of these courses or avoid the program entirely. While participant consent does encourage buy-in, the program can fail to reach individuals who desperately need it. The opt-in system has allowed individuals like suicide bomber Agus Sujatno to refuse participation, serve out their sentences, and return to the outside world even more invigorated than before.