SOFT-TARGET PROTECTIONEvaluation Approaches for the Protection of Venues and Public Spaces from Terrorism

In recent years, governments across the world have included legislation and published guidance material on how to mitigate the impact of terrorism on venues and public spaces. Known as Protective Security this pillar of counterterrorism comprises physical security, personnel security, and cyber security.

In 2023, the UK brought forward a draft Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill – a legal responsibility for owners and operators of venues and public spaces to take steps to reduce the threat to the public from terrorist attacks. As a result, there is a growing need to understand how protective security can be co-created effectively and efficiently and – more fundamentally – what data should be collected to gain a better picture of whether and how the intervention measures have ‘worked’ in terms of both delivery and uptake.

A forthcoming report from CREST is part of a project which will develop a new methodological, evaluative framework for understanding and evaluating the effectiveness and effects of policies, methods and approaches designed to protect venues and public spaces including application to the Protect Duty.

Evaluation Challenges in the Field of Terrorism Including for Protective Security

1. The lack of a common, globally accepted definition of terrorism and violent extremism presents a clear limitation in the design and targeting of interventions. Given the diversity of focus areas, confused or contested definitions of terrorism, and congruently vague policy objectives, those involved in counter terrorism initiatives often find it hard to formulate indicators of success that relate concrete measures to impact on beneficiaries. Whilst output level indicators are relatively easy to identify, outcome and impact level indicators are much harder. The resulting tendency to rely on output level indicators alone is insufficient if we are trying to understand effectiveness.

2. Terrorist decision-making when carrying out or preparing attacks is poorly understood, as is the effectiveness of deterrence by denial, an approach that seeks to demonstrate the low likelihood that an attack will succeed. To some authors, it is ineffectual to view effectiveness in CT interventions in terms of the lowered frequency or number of terrorist attacks, the number of plots disrupted, or the degree of lethality caused by attacks, because a terrorist adversary might view success differently. Certain terrorist groups may benefit even if an attack fails: foiled attempts attract publicity, cause fear within target audiences, and demonstrate groups are active.