INTELLIGENCEWinning the 21st-Century Intelligence Contest
The conduct of intelligence activities is inherently a strategic dynamic between rival actors simultaneously playing offence and defense. Analogies with war, sporting contests and competition abound. The prize for a nation’s leadership? Holding an advantage in decision-making and action.
The conduct of intelligence activities is inherently a strategic dynamic between rival actors simultaneously playing offence and defense. Analogies with war, sporting contests and competition abound. Action and reaction. Denial and deception. Or, in its Soviet incarnation, ‘sword and shield’—the KGB’s motto.
The prize for a nation’s leadership? Holding an advantage in decision-making and action. Knowing others better than they know you. And being able to use that advantage and that knowledge to the benefit of your interests and security.
This essence is highlighted in two important and insightful new works on intelligence.
Calder Walton’s Spies: The Epic Intelligence War etween East and West charts the history of espionage and counterespionage through the 20th century and into the 21st, illuminating an ongoing shadow war between the UK and US (and their allies) on the one hand and the Soviet bloc (and later Russia) on the other.
Walton, a historian at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, through archival study and interviews with practitioners and defectors, finds that the struggle started in 1917 (and not after World War II). The resulting intelligence ‘warfare’ was at the bleeding edge of the next 75 years. What’s more, it didn’t end in 1991 despite the West’s ‘peace dividend’. The Soviets’ perceived humiliation is key to understanding Russian revanchism today—seen not only in Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine but in Russian intelligence outrages worldwide. Disturbingly—especially in light of recent events—Walton concludes that the West has a Russia problem not a Putin problem.
Spies has a particularly contemporary resonance, illustrated by Walton’s revelatory account of attempts to assassinate Russian Foreign Intelligence Service defector Aleksandr Poteyev in Florida just three years ago. This links to earlier BBC reporting of Russian efforts to track down Poteyev, including using disinformation about his ‘death’ to flush out those with knowledge of his whereabouts.
Furthermore, Walton’s reflections extend to an emergent China–West confrontation. Espionage is once more at the front line of what he describes as a new cold war with Russia and China. Different, yes (how could it be otherwise in a globalized economy?), but a cold war nonetheless, and one that’s critical to keep cold given the continuing threat of mutual nuclear destruction.
