ARGUMENT: EXTREMISMCountering Domestic Violent Extremism in the Ranks: Barriers to Recruitment Screening
There an uncomfortably high number of Jan. 6 cases involving connections to military, law enforcement, and veteran personnel. These cases echo trends that have existed throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Carrie Cordero and Katherine L. Kuzminski write that these most recent cases once again raise the question of whether the United States has a problem with domestic violent extremism (DVE) in the military, veteran, and law enforcement ranks.
In early November, a former Army reservist pleaded guilty to a plot, along with a Jan. 6 defendant, to murder Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) employees working on the Jan. 6 cases. That same week, a former member of the New Jersey National Guard surrendered to local police after a manhunt in connection with federal Jan. 6 charges. Carrie Cordero and Katherine L. Kuzminski write in Lawfare that these are the most recent developments in Jan. 6-related cases involving defendants affiliated with the military or law enforcement professions. According to data maintained by NPR, approximately 15 percent of the Jan. 6 cases involve defendants with military or law enforcement ties.
They continues:
The Jan. 6 cases—and their connection to military, law enforcement, and veteran personnel—echo trends that have existed throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. These most recent trends once again raise the question of whether the United States has a problem with domestic violent extremism (DVE) in the military, veteran, and law enforcement ranks. After almost two years of looking at this question, our current assessment is: Yes, but it’s hard to assess the extent of the problem for at least three reasons.
First, it’s hard to make the case that DVE is a challenge in these professional communities because, although there are both obvious as well as infamous specific examples, the raw numbers of military or law enforcement personnel who have engaged in acts of DVE are quite small compared to the number of service members overall. As such, current statistics do not garner the same level of attention as either the notable, concrete modern historical examples such as the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing—the deadliest incident of domestic terrorism in U.S. history, perpetrated by Army veteran Timothy McVeigh—nor the anecdotal observations that experts provide. In short, statistics—to the extent they exist—do not tell the whole story.
Second, it’s hard to determine whether these communities have a DVE problem because, notwithstanding the existence of concrete examples of the events of the past few years, there is very little data available about the number of active-duty service members or law enforcement professionals who affiliate with or engage in activities of extremist organizations, short of committing actual crimes. Such affiliations are protected by First Amendment rights, and engagement in criminal activity is already against the law.
