Perspective: Islamic StateIslamic State after the Death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi

As its so-called caliphate expanded across Syria and Iraq, Islamic State (IS) promised its followers an apocalyptic battle to come. Eager jihadist propagandists predicted that a final victory over the “crusader armies” would usher in the day of judgment and give birth to a new world. The man who was to lead that battle, the self-proclaimed caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, instead blew himself up in a tunnel in Syria on October 26th, murdering two of his own children as he died.

The Economist writes that “His suicide, to avoid capture by American forces, marks the end of an era for IS. The group once held sway over millions of Syrians and Iraqis in an area the size of Britain. It had already lost its territory, clawed back at staggering cost by a mix of American air power, Syrian militiamen and Iraqi troops. Now it has lost its leader as well.”

The Economist adds:

Yet this does not mark the end of IS. The group endures as a low-level insurgency in parts of Syria and Iraq, carrying out attacks (see map) and preying on civilians to fund its operations. It has also diversified, with a string of wilayats (provinces) around the world. Though it may never again hold so much territory, it will remain a threat. And the conditions that allowed it to rise—a region of corrupt, sectarian and ineffective governments that lord over poor, alienated populations—have, if anything, grown worse.

His death will disrupt IS, but perhaps not for long. In a forthcoming book Jenna Jordan of the Georgia Institute of Technology examines over 1,000 cases involving the killing or capture of leaders of terrorist or insurgent groups. She says three factors contribute to a group’s resilience afterwards: its degree of bureaucracy, ability to draw on local resources and ideological zeal. These qualities ensure that its mission does not depend on a single leader.

IS ranks highly on all three. It has kept meticulous records and exported its procedures to international franchises that can apply them independently. Though it no longer pulls in $1m a day, as it once did, it still has deep pockets, and is likely to benefit from local Sunni disaffection in Syria, as Bashar al-Assad’s reviled forces fill the vacuum left by President Donald Trump’s retreat. Its ideological purity resonates independently of Mr. Baghdadi. As a result, IS “should ultimately choose a successor easily and recover quickly,” says Ms. Jordan. Indeed, it has proved its resilience before. Mr. Baghdadi rose to the top because two predecessors were killed in American strikes in 2006 and 2010.

The raid which killed al-Baghdadi took place against the backdrop of President Trump’s decision to withdraw U.S. troops from northern Syria, and allowing Turkey’s incursion to create a buffer zone south of the Syria-Turkey border, a buffer zone which is now jointly patrolled by Turkey and Russia. Under pressure from the U.S. military, Trump agreed to leave a few hundreds troops in east Syria, to assist the Kurds guard the oil fields under their control. The rest of the American troops withdrawn from northern Syria will stay in northern Iraq.

The Economist writes:

It is confusion, not a successful commando raid, that will be Mr Trump’s legacy in Syria. The mission relied on having American troops in the region, which he is withdrawing; working with allies, whom he disparages; and relying on intelligence agencies, which he derides. When Mr Baghdadi’s successor emerges, America will be ill-placed to deal with him.