NIJJAR AFFAIRWhat Might We Learn from the Nijjar Affair and the Breakdown in Canada–India Relations?
Khalistani activism overseas—not just in Canada, but also in the United Kingdom, United States and Australia—is a major concern for New Delhi, not a marginal one, as some governments might think. And whatever has occurred in this particular case, India has long since shed its earlier adherence to “strategic restraint”: it is clear that India is willing to use force and take risks to defend its interests. Moreover, this muscularity is popular within India and segments of the Indian diaspora overseas.
Justin Trudeau’s announcement that Canadian authorities suspect India had some role in the killing of Sikh separatist leader Hardeep Singh Nijjar outside a temple in Surrey, British Columbia on 18 June was dramatic, but hardly unexpected. The Canadian media began speculating about India’s possible involvement soon after Nijjar’s murder, prompted by leaks from the intelligence services. Other media outlets quickly connected the case to the untimely deaths of two other Sikh activists. Avtar Singh Khanda led a violent protest outside the Indian High Commission in London in March and died a few days before Nijjar, and Paramjit Singh Panjwar was shot by unidentified gunmen in Lahore, Pakistan, in May.
New Delhi has rejected Trudeau’s claims, but this issue is not going to go away. Nor is it likely to remain within the bounds of the Canada-India relationship. Given the patchy and contested information we have at this point, what might Australia learn from the Nijjar affair and how should Canberra respond?
The first thing to note is that Khalistani activism overseas—not just in Canada, but also in the United Kingdom, United States and Australia—is a major concern for New Delhi, not a marginal one, as some governments might think. The drivers of this concern are mixed. Senior figures in the Indian government, not least national security advisor Ajit Doval, experienced the brutal Khalistani-driven Punjab insurgency of the 1980s and 90s first hand. They would likely favor a hard-line approach. So too might more cynical elements of Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party who might seek to frame Khalistani activism as a threat, as they have in recent years, and consolidate political support with a tough response.
The second lesson is that whatever has occurred in this particular case, India has long since shed its earlier adherence to “strategic restraint.” Even if New Delhi played no role in Nijjar’s killing, as it insists, it is nevertheless clear that India is willing to use force and take risks to defend its interests. The special forces raid into Pakistani-administered Kashmir in 2016 and an airstrike on alleged terrorist camps in Pakistan-proper in 2019 were clear demonstrations of this new approach. So too were the premeditated encounter with Chinese soldiers in the Galwan Valley in mid-2020 and the rapid deployment of tens of thousands of troops into the Himalayas in the weeks that followed.
