Russian Wargame Practicing Tactical Nukes Use Is Warning to West

While not explicitly mentioned as conditions for use of nuclear weapons in those documents, Condition 1 and Condition 2 have been mentioned by Russian leaders, respectively, at least 10 times and two times, in the period from Feb. 22, 2022, to May 5, 2024. As I wrote on May 6, these references may indicate that the Russian leadership may be considering introducing them in the next editions of Russia’s military doctrine (which currently dates back to 2014) and/or in the Basic Principles of State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence (which dates back to 2020). That the doctrinal language on nuclear weapons use may undergo this kind of liberalization is something that Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov implied in comments to Russian media on May 9. When asked in the same media opportunity if Russia could revise its nuclear doctrine to allow a preventive strike, Ryabkov said: “The environment itself is changing. This is why the correspondence between the basis documents in this sector and the need of ensuring our security is being constantly analyzed.” Speaking on the same day as Ryabkov, Putin chose not to discuss conditions for use of nuclear weapons, but he did comment on the NSNW wargame itself, claiming it was “nothing unusual.” Speaking with Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko beside him, Putin said on May 9 that the wargame will consist of three phases and that Belarus, which hosts some of Russian NSNWs, has been offered the opportunity to participate in the second phase.  

Nearly two weeks after Putin’s comments, the Russian MoD announced on May 21 that the first phase of the NSNW wargame had begun in the Southern Military District, which abuts Ukraine. The missile units of the Russian Ground Forces in the SMD are practicing how to first deliver nuclear warheads to their delivery vehicles (the Iskander surface-to-surface missiles), then to install them in these missiles and then deploy them to the areas they would be launched from, according to the MoD statement. Meanwhile, Russian Aerospace Force units are practicing installing nuclear warheads into Kinzhal air-to-surface missiles, which are carried by warplanes (e.g. MiG-31 interceptors, in contrast to some earlier Zapad (West) wargames, in which long-range Tupolev bombers simulated launches of air-to-surface nuclear missiles), with these planes subsequently conducting flights in designated patrol areas, according to the MoD statement.²

As stated above, in addition to the obvious purpose of training its troops to use NSNWs, the Russian leadership means to use this exercise to signal to the West that it should refrain from escalating assistance to Ukraine following France’s (and some other NATO members’) warnings that they may send troops to Ukraine, as well as Britain’s decision to allow Ukraine to use U.K.-supplied weapons for strikes inside Russia.³ The wargame also appears to serve as a broader warning to the West that, if the high-intensity militarized stand-off between West and Russia continues over Ukraine and other issues, Russia may liberalize its conditions for use of nuclear weapons in its doctrinal documents. Finally, the exercise may be evidence that Putin intends to stick to his post-reshuffle intention to keep chief of the General Staff and first deputy defense minister Valery Gerasimov in his posts, at least for now, in spite of replacing Sergei Shoigu with Anatoly Belousov as the country’s defense minister. The NSNW wargame is being conducted under the “leadership of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces,” according to the MoD’s May 21 statement. If that language means Gerasimov is commanding the current wargame, then that indicates Putin meant it when he said upon firing Shoigu earlier this month that he has no plans to oust Gerasimov as well. After all, Gerasimov probably would not have been picked by Putin to command such an important wargame if Putin meant to fire him soon.

Footnotes

1. The same language then appeared in the MoD’s May 21 announcement that the exercise was beginning that day. “The ongoing exercise is aimed at maintaining the readiness of personnel and equipment of units for the combat use of non-strategic nuclear weapons to react as well as to unconditionally ensure the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Russian state in response to provocative statements and threats of individual Western officials against the Russian Federation.”

2. It should also be noted that the ongoing NSNW exercise is not the only major nuclear wargame that Russia might be holding this year. There is also one major annual wargame meant to train Russia’s strategic nuclear triad..

3. Putin’s press secretary Dmitry Peskov cited these statements by the U.K. and France among the reasons why Russia decided to hold the NSNW wargame. 

Simon Saradzhyan is the founding director of Russia Matters.The article, originally published in Russia Matters, is published here courtesy of the Harvard Kennedy School’s Russia Matters. Opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author.