Let’s Take a Close Look at How We Protect Our Undersea Cables

Considering the cost to repair a cable and the inevitable disruption to services, this a paltry sum. When Vocus’s Australian Singapore Cable in the Perth protection zone was cut in 2021—the only known cut to a cable in an Australian protection zone—the cost to repair was $1.5 million.

It’s hard to explain why more applications have not been made. One suggestion from a cable company was the ‘free rider’ issue—whereby other companies can take advantage of a safety zone funded by competitors. But that doesn’t seem enough of a blocker.

Part of the problem is there are no metrics by which to judge the efficacy of the protection zones. There is no requirement for ACMA to report disruptions, nor for companies to report them to ACMA in the first place, though there are other organizations who track this, such as the International Cable Protection Committee.

To judge if the current regime is working, we need metrics such as the number of cables disrupted by human activity in a zone compared to the number outside zones. This way, there are numbers to crunch to determine if a zone is, say, 5 percent or 50 percent safer than unprotected areas.

These numbers would also help ACMA justify the creation of new zones. Cable owners have said that ACMA should be unilaterally declaring and funding these new zones as needed.

But ACMA also has to consider the impact of imposing new regulations in an area given it would encroach on members of the public’s activities. There needs to be a demonstrable benefit to justify legislative or regulatory change.

Additionally, Schedule 3A doesn’t cater for the monitoring of the zones. Penalties only act as a deterrent if there is a perception that criminals will be caught and punished—yet this hasn’t happened. The Australian Federal Police told the 2010 review of schedule 3A that their legislative requirements didn’t extend to monitoring the zones and that, at any rate, they were not equipped to do so.

Presumably, actual patrolling of the zones is conducted by Maritime Border Command, and threats to cables are one of the many types of threats to security within its remit. Otherwise, prevention measures in the zones include cable monitoring by industry and awareness-raising activities.

ACMA recommended in 2010 to determine if monitoring is necessary in the zones. This didn’t eventuate, but it should happen. Reviewing and updating the legislation would clarify who has responsibility for monitoring the zones and strengthen the deterrent effect of the penalties.

Finally, a review would offer a chance to clarify how the 3A regime identifies a cable as one of ‘national significance’. This is the term that determines whether or not a protection zone applies, but it is a vague definition. One way to bring clarity would be to align the definition with that in the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018, and other relevant legislation.

So, there is a clear case for a review. It could consider a scheme to capture metrics, determine the value and feasibility of a monitoring and enforcement regime, and look at aligning the 3A definitions and concepts to other critical infrastructure legislation.

Above all, this would make it clear to Australian carriers, international carriers contemplating an Australian landing—and indeed other countries looking to implement their own legislative regime—that Australia remains the ‘gold standard’ for cable regimes and that we are constantly looking at how best to keep undersea cables safe.

Jessie Jacob is a senior analyst at ASPI. This article is published courtesy of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI).