Japanese Yakuza Leader Pleads Guilty to Nuclear Materials Trafficking

Ebisawa conspired to broker the purchase, from UC-1, of U.S.-made surface-to-air missiles, as well as other heavy-duty weaponry, intended for multiple ethnic armed groups in Burma (including the leader of an ethnic insurgent group in Burma (CC-1)), and to accept large quantities of heroin and methamphetamine for distribution as partial payment for the weapons. Ebisawa understood the weapons to have been manufactured in the U.S. and taken from U.S. military bases in Afghanistan. Ebisawa planned for the heroin and methamphetamine to be distributed in the New York market.

In addition, Ebisawa conspired to sell, in a separate transaction, 500 kilograms of methamphetamine and 500 kilograms of heroin to UC-1 for distribution in New York. In furtherance of that transaction, on or about June 16, 2021, and on or about Sept. 27, 2021, one of Ebisawa’s co-defendants provided samples of approximately one kilogram of methamphetamine and approximately 1.4 kilograms of heroin. Ebisawa also worked to launder $100,000 in purported narcotics proceeds from the U.S. to Japan.

Finally, beginning in early 2020, Ebisawa informed UC-1 and a DEA confidential source (CS-1) that Ebisawa had access to a large quantity of nuclear materials that he wanted to sell. Later that year, Ebisawa sent UC-1 a series of photographs depicting rocky substances with Geiger counters measuring radiation, as well as pages of what Ebisawa represented to be lab analyses indicating the presence of thorium and uranium in the depicted substances. In response to Ebisawa’s repeated inquiries, UC-1 agreed, as part of the DEA’s investigation, to help Ebisawa broker the sale of his nuclear materials to UC-1’s associate, who was posing as an Iranian general (the General), for use in a nuclear weapons program. Ebisawa then offered to supply the General with “plutonium” that would be even “better” and more “powerful” than uranium for this purpose. Ebisawa further proposed, together with two other co-conspirators (CC-2 and CC-3), to UC-1 that CC-1 sell uranium to the General, through Ebisawa, to fund CC-1’s weapons purchase.

Thereafter, on a Feb. 4, 2022, videoconference, CC-2 told UC-1 that CC-1 had available more than 2,000 kilograms of Thorium-232 and more than 100 kilograms of uranium in the compound U3O8 — referring to a compound of uranium commonly found in the uranium concentrate powder known as “yellowcake” — and that CC-1 could produce as much as five tons of nuclear materials in Burma. CC-2 also advised that CC-1 had provided samples of the uranium and thorium, which CC-2 was prepared to show to UC-1’s purported buyers. CC-2 noted that the samples should be packed “to contain … the radiation.”  Approximately one week later, Ebisawa, CC-2, and CC-3 participated in a series of meetings with UC-1 and CS-1 in Southeast Asia, to discuss their ongoing weapons, narcotics, and nuclear materials transactions. During one of these meetings, CC-2 asked UC-1 to meet in CC-2’s hotel room. Inside the room, CC-2 showed UC-1 two plastic containers each holding a powdery yellow substance (nuclear samples), which CC-2 described as “yellowcake.”  CC-2 advised that one container held a sample of uranium in the compound U3O8, and the other container held Thorium-232.

With the assistance of Thai authorities, the nuclear samples were seized and subsequently transferred to the custody of U.S. law enforcement. A nuclear forensic laboratory in the United States examined the nuclear samples and determined that both samples contain detectable quantities of uranium, thorium, and plutonium. In particular, the laboratory determined that the isotope composition of the plutonium found in the nuclear samples is weapons-grade, meaning that the plutonium, if produced in sufficient quantities, would be suitable for use in a nuclear weapon.

Ebisawa pleaded guilty to six counts contained in the superseding indictment.

A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.