Mending Fences: Strengthening Homeland Defense through Integrated Civil-Military Air Surveillance

The United States should focus more eyes on the sky, and it should do so quickly. Clare notes some of the existing capabilities which could e incorporated into a more robust homeland air defense network:

·  The first priority is to incorporate all of the Federal Aviation Administration’s more than 600 air traffic control radars into the homeland air defense network. In addition, weather radars such as the Federal Aviation Administration’s Terminal Doppler Weather Radar and Next Generation Radar could make a substantive contribution. 

·  Regarding maritime sensors, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration uses the Integrated Ocean Observing System to monitor ocean currents up to 200 nautical miles offshore. With suitable processing, high-frequency radars like this could be redirected to detect airborne objects at low altitudes.

·  National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration weather satellites could also produce air targeting data using processors at the downlink sites. Future weather satellites could be configured to detect solid objects on demand, transmitting data directly to the ground receiver.

·  Additional low-altitude aerial sensors could help too. U.S. Customs and Border Protection employs a variety of sensors to detect illicit air traffic approaching the United States, including the Tethered Aerostat Radar System, which is optimized for detecting low-altitude threats.

·  Finally, the Defense Department could take advantage of the ubiquitous emissions from cellular towers, radio and television stations, and even geostationary satellites such as those of Sirius XM satellite radio.

Clare concludes

The United States is not currently prepared to face a growing number of national security threats and challenges, including from the air. Lacking a comprehensive homeland air defense network, the Department of Defense should move with urgency to mend America’s hole-riddled aerial fence. Affordable and realistic fixes could be achieved by integrating civil and military sensors into a better aerial threat common operating picture.

There are a number of steps the Department of Defense can take now. First, it should assess civil sensors to determine which provide the most value, and prioritize and pursue civil partnerships accordingly. As part of this effort, it should review the Federal Aviation Administration’s Radar Divestiture Program and determine whether radars slated for decommissioning should be retained, using Defense Department funds if necessary.

Second, the department should review authorities for military employment of civil systems in wartime, and recommend changes where appropriate. Federal law provides for the Coast Guard to be transferred to the Defense Department during war. Executive orders and law establish similar measures for the Federal Aviation Administration and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. More such arrangements may be necessary.

Finally, it should develop software to extract track data from civil sensor data and deploy off-the-shelf hardware suites, with associated funding, personnel, and training for installation, maintenance, and operations. This would require relatively little effort. Indeed, the entire project might be delegated to a government laboratory or defense contractor.

In both World War II and the Cold War, hundreds of thousands of civilian volunteers turned up to help plug the holes in America’s aerial fence. Today, civil technology could play a similar role in securing the skies. If history is any indication, the American public will answer the call to action.