POST-U.S. NATOFrench Nuclear Deterrence for Europe: How Effective Could It Be Against Russia?
Does France have the capacity to defend Europe? Would the deployment of the French nuclear umbrella in Eastern Europe make Europe strategically autonomous, giving it the means to defend itself independently?
In February 2020, French President Emmanuel Macron said it was time to reflect on the European dimension of French nuclear deterrence. He proposed a strategic dialogue as well as joint nuclear exercises between European partners. Five years later, Germany’s likely next chancellor, Friedrich Merz, responded to this call, advocating an extension of the French nuclear umbrella to Germany – while a US led by President Donald Trump no longer appears to be a reliable partner for protecting Europe.
But does France have the capacity to defend Europe? Would the deployment of the French nuclear umbrella in Eastern Europe make Europe strategically autonomous, giving it the means to defend itself independently?
French Nuclear Deterrence Against the Russian Threat
France originally developed its nuclear arsenal in response to the threat of Soviet invasion and to avoid any dependence on the US. According to a stable doctrine that political leaders regularly reaffirmed, the state [would use] its strategic arsenal by air and submarine in the event of an attack against its vital interests.
But the fact remains that without US support, the balance of power appears largely unfavorable to France, which has a total of 290 nuclear warheads compared to at least 1,600 deployed warheads and nearly 2,800 stockpiled warheads on the Russian side.
Certainly, the explosive power of thermonuclear warheads, combined with the range of the French M51 strategic sea-to-land ballistic missile, would make it possible to destroy the main Russian cities, including Moscow.
However, the Russians would only need “200 seconds to atomize Paris”, according to an estimate given on Russian television about “Satan II” thermonuclear missiles.
These scenarios recall the specter of adversaries destroying enemy cities in a piecemeal atomic exchange, in which Russia could rely on its vastness to win through attrition. This potential for reciprocity must be kept in mind amid the mutual bet of nuclear deterrence.
To boost the impact of French nuclear deterrence, a partnership could be envisaged with the United Kingdom. A nuclear power since 1952, London now only has ballistic missiles launched by submarine and has decided, since Brexit, to increase its arsenal to 260 warheads. But although they share common interests, these two European nuclear powers are not equivalent.
