French Nuclear Deterrence for Europe: How Effective Could It Be Against Russia?

Unlike the UK, which is a member of NATO’s nuclear planning group and whose warheads are designed in the US, France produces its weapons on its own territory and is not subject to any NATO obligations. This gives Paris a great deal of leeway in defining its doctrine. France can also speak on behalf of the European Union, of which it has been a part since its creation.

French Nuclear Power: An Alternative to U.S. Deterrence
France officially became an atomic power in 1960 by relying on its own resources, with US support fluctuating according to events. The emergence of an independent French strategic force long annoyed Washington, which sought to restrict it by means of international accords such as the 1963 treaty limiting atmospheric nuclear tests and the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty. Since 1974, the French nuclear force has officially had a specific dissuasive role within NATO, contributing to the overall security of the transatlantic alliance by complicating the calculations of potential adversaries.

Almost 60 years ago, US president Lyndon Johnson reinforced doubts about the White House’s determination to fully commit to the defense of Europe. Today, Trump’s desire to end US support for Ukraine confirms these suspicions. Consequently, increasingly insistent voices are calling for the acceptance of a French nuclear force that would extend to the European level.

A French Nuclear Umbrella in Eastern Europe
Merz’s call for the French nuclear umbrella to extend to Germany aligns with Paris’s proposal to establish a dialogue involving Europeans in a common approach. As France’s defense minister has pointed out, the precise definition of vital interest is up to its president. However, the use of nuclear weapons to protect Europe requires a strategic discussion to define the power to be acquired, the interests to be defended and the method of nuclear fire command.

Moving toward a Europeanisation of nuclear force means increasing deterrent capabilities and, therefore, expanding the French arsenal so it can respond to threats affecting all 27 EU member states. This would require the creation of additional stocks of fissile material and the reactivation of production plants in Pierrelatte and Marcoule, which were dismantled in the late 1990s.

Dogma about what constitutes a sufficient arsenal must also be questioned. If 290 nuclear warheads represent the value that France places on defending its existence, this price seems to neglect the scale of the European continent, and logic confirms it: continent-sized nuclear powers such as the US and Russia – and soon, China – are deploying an arsenal of around 1,000 thermonuclear warheads.

Ramping up power would take time and require a budgetary effort to increase the number of missiles and carrier aircraft. In addition to the construction of new infrastructure in European partner countries, the cost could exceed €10 billion per year, not including indirect costs related to maintenance and logistics. This is a lot to take into account, especially since the political and strategic offer of extended nuclear protection evolves according to circumstances.

Until now, Germany preferred that France assume a role that was simply complementary to the extended deterrence of the US, but Washington’s threatened abandonment of Ukraine increases the Russian threat. As Macron has indicated, France could respond by proposing the pre-positioning of its nuclear forces in Eastern European countries with the idea of eventually replacing the US.

This French nuclear umbrella would give concrete form to European strategic autonomy through the deployment of nuclear-capable combat aircraft, a sign of European political solidarity that would make Moscow’s calculations more difficult.

The visible presence of these aircraft in Eastern Europe could prevent Russia from attacking countries in the region with conventional means, as such an attack could provoke a French nuclear response on behalf of Europe.

Benoît Grémare is Chercheur associé à l’Institut d’Etudes de Stratégie et de Défense, Université Jean Moulin Lyon 3. This article is published courtesy of The Conversation.