To Avoid a Ukraine-Style Quid Pro Quo, Australia Needs to Work with the U.S. on Critical Minerals
Robertson Barracks in Darwin hosts rotational US Marine deployments, bolstering US force posture in the Indo-Pacific without the cost or political sensitivity of permanent basing. Joint Defense Facility Pine Gap is essential to US intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, providing real-time missile warning and electronic signals intelligence that the US cannot easily replicate elsewhere. Harold E Holt Naval Communications Station is one of the US’s primary links to its submarines, securing its undersea deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. Northwest Cape and Cocos Islands radar installations are vital to US Space Command, tracking adversary satellites and space debris amid China’s expanding orbital footprint.
If Trump sees Ukraine’s rare earths as leverage, Australia must ensure that its strategic assets are recognized as even more valuable. The risk lies in failing to assert this before any transactional demands are made.
Australia cannot afford to passively assume alliance obligations will hold under a leader who views diplomacy as a business process. Instead, Canberra must shape the terms of engagement, reinforcing why its role in the Indo-Pacific delivers more long-term value to the US than simple access to its minerals. This requires a more assertive, transactional approach that speaks Trump’s language of hard bargains while safeguarding Australia’s sovereignty.
Australia should pursue a strategic critical minerals agreement with the US that reduces both nations’ dependence on China’s dominance of rare earth supply chains and processing. A deal that prioritizes joint investment in refining and manufacturing capacity, rather than just raw material supply, will strengthen sovereign capabilities, enhance supply chain resilience, and ensure long-term security for both economies.
This type of practical initiative would complement Canberra’s framing of the alliance as one of true partners, with emphasis on joint military infrastructure, intelligence cooperation and Indo-Pacific stability as assets of equal value worthy of security guarantees. Strengthening leverage before negotiations are forced to start by some third-party action is essential to ensuring the US recognizes that Australia’s strategic geography, intelligence facilities and force integration are irreplaceable advantages.
Expanding resource partnerships with like-minded nations such as Japan and EU members will reduce dependency on any single power’s economic coercion tactics. Pre-emptively signaling non-negotiable red lines will reinforce that while Australia is willing to cooperate, access to sovereign resources cannot be dictated under duress.
For the US, Ukraine’s rare earths are a short-term geopolitical play. In contrast, Australia’s strategic positioning and alliance role are long-term necessities. As the Indo-Pacific becomes the central theatre for global competition, the US needs Pine Gap, RAAF Tindal, HMAS Stirling and Robertson Barracks. The difference between Ukraine and Australia lies not just in geography but in bargaining power. In Trump’s transactional world, Australia must ensure it negotiates from a position of strength, not subservience.
Raelene Lockhorst is the deputy director and John Coyne the director of national security programs at ASPI. This article is published courtesy of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI).
