The Far-Reaching Impacts of Agricultural Biorisk Research

While at the symposium, I had the opportunity to present some of the work that my colleagues and I at MRIGlobal are doing in this space. One gap we have identified in laboratory biorisk management is the lack of guidance regarding wearing jewelry associated with body piercings in laboratories. We presented a poster of our research, “A Piercing Issue: Assessing the Ability to Decontaminate Body Piercings,” which demonstrates that this gap can be addressed through the generation of qualitative data. Our research also explored the implications of our findings for safety culture and its relationship to other gaps in understanding about fomite transmission in a laboratory setting.

One of the biggest hurdles to generating evidence-based practices is funding. In a special session of the symposium, an exciting funding opportunity for Addressing Agricultural Biorisk Evidence Base Gaps with Applied Research through the Elizabeth R. Griffin Program was announced. This came on the heels of the announcement that the Elizabeth R. Griffin Program has moved to a new home at the John Hopkins Center for Health Security.

Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) and African Swine Fever Virus (ASFV)
If there is one project at the symposium that bridged the two themes of applied biosafety and HPAI, it was the work presented by Dr. John Luchansky with the U.S. Department of Agriculture looking at “If Avian Influenza Virus Were Found in Raw (Ground) Beef – Would Cooking Kill it?” This preliminary work indicated that when cooked to recommended temperatures, the virus responsible for HPAI was killed. This was just a small (but very cool!) piece of the puzzle presented throughout the week, looking at how the United States is responding to HPAI and preparing for its increasing presence.

Naturally, conversations then shifted to African Swine Fever Virus (ASFV) and the work being done to prepare if a case of this disease is identified in the United States. One of the most interesting bits of information I learned during the symposium was that more than one million swine are transported in the United States every day, and that a two-year outbreak of ASFV could cost more than $15 billion.

Final Thoughts
During this symposium, biosafety and biosecurity were described as one of the invisible waters of national security. It was highlighted throughout the event that the impacts of a biological disaster, whether in the form of a human, animal, or plant outbreak, could be far-reaching. As a result, it is crucial that biosafety and biosecurity do not remain invisible. As we face increasingly frequent, evolving, and complex biological threats, our preparedness, vigilance, and investment in these research areas is more important than ever. For this reason, agriculture biorisk mitigation must be further integrated into policy and research discussions, including national security strategies. Only by making biosafety and biosecurity visible, prioritized, and fully understood will we build the resilience needed to address the growing challenges agriculture biorisks present.

Jay Bickell is a student in the MS Biodefense program at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University. In her current position as a Staff Scientist at MRIGlobal, Jay supports biorisk management programs for various commercial, academic, and government clients. This article is published courtesy of the Pandora Report.