Kinetic Operations Bring Authoritarian Violence to Democratic Streets
Russia’s use of incendiary parcels that caught fire prior to being loaded on cargo planes in Germany, Poland, and the United Kingdom and the failed arson attack on a bus depot in Prague further highlight the Kremlin’s willingness to place civilians in harm’s way to sow chaos in democracies—and to exact retribution against adversarial countries that are supportive of Ukraine. These incidents, as well as a growing number of vandalism campaigns in major European cities, signal a stark shift from remote operations conducted primarily online to acts of physical aggression that foster a broader sense of fear and insecurity in democratic societies.
Beyond the cases publicly attributed to Russia, there is mounting evidence that those incidents are only the tip of the iceberg. The severing of undersea internet cables and other major acts of sabotage remain unattributed, but the Kremlin remains a likely culprit. These attacks on infrastructure point to a broader, more insidious campaign designed to gradually weaken Western resolve.
The PRC also deserves a mention, though its approach to kinetic operations has differed from Russia’s. PRC state actions still largely focus on the harassment of dissidents and diaspora communities beyond its borders. These measures are undoubtedly oppressive and designed to silence both perceived enemies of the state and organic civil society voices abroad, but the PRC has yet to mirror Russia’s reckless tactics of deliberately putting random civilians in harm’s way.
Trend Analysis
Kinetic operations feed into the destabilization campaigns that authoritarian states have been waging on democracies for years. For example, Russian state-sponsored information manipulation campaigns, amplified by proxies it covertly finances, have long fanned the flames of fragmentation in democratic societies. Kinetic operations add another layer of turmoil by heightening real-world fear, a condition that authoritarian states can then exploit to wage further FIMI campaigns. In this climate of uncertainty, vulnerable individuals become more susceptible to radicalization and disillusioned groups are more easily recruited for destabilizing activities, potentially creating a vicious cycle of destabilization.
Recent Russian kinetic operations in Europe also highlight the Kremlin’s ability to adapt. Due to the mass expulsion of Russian diplomats in 2022, Russia’s embassies and consulates throughout the EU became short-staffed. Pre-2022 kinetic operations relied primarily on Russian intelligence officers to carry them out, and they often used serious weapons that the Russian state provided like radioactive materials and nerve gas. In contrast, after the 2022 expulsions and a reduction of the Russian intelligence presence in the EU, there emerged a clear trend of using proxies and hired operatives, including petty criminals who are not Russian nationals. These proxies are tasked to start fires, vandalize cars, and spray divisive symbols on city buildings. This shift, notably highlighted in the latest yearly threat assessment by Estonian intelligence, complicates attribution and allows the Kremlin to maintain operational flexibility while avoiding direct state accountability. Combined with the founding of the SSD, this innovation in recruitment and execution indicates that kinetic operations are likely to be an increasingly prominent tool Russia uses to conduct FIMI campaigns.
Conclusion
Kinetic operations represent a significant evolution in authoritarian interference, and the establishment of Russia’s SSD confirms that these operations are now a central element of Moscow’s hybrid warfare against democracies. When combined with other FIMI tools like cyber operations and information manipulation, these physical acts of aggression not only threaten critical infrastructure and public safety, but also erode public trust and deepen societal divides.
To safeguard democratic institutions, Europe and its allies must adopt a robust, multi-layered response. This includes enhancing intelligence sharing, strengthening attribution capabilities, updating legal frameworks, and imposing targeted sanctions. Moreover, deepening public-private and international collaborations is essential to building resilient infrastructure defenses against state-sponsored kinetic operations and related hybrid threats. Only through such a comprehensive strategy can Europe hope to push back against actions that can at times be characterized as acts of state terrorism and preserve the integrity of open, democratic societies.
Etienne Soula, based in Brussels, is a research analyst with the Alliance for Securing Democracy. Lea George is a research trainee at the Alliance for Securing Democracy. The article, originally posted to the website of the German Marshall Fund of the United States, is published here courtesy of the GMFUS.The views expressed in GMF publications and commentary are the views of the author alone.
