CHINA WATCHChina Targets Canada’s Election—and May Be Targeting Australia’s
Following Canadian authorities’ discovery of a Chinese information operation targeting their country’s election, Australians, too, should beware such risks. In fact, there are already signs that Beijing is interfering in campaigning for the Australian election to be held on 3 May.
Following Canadian authorities’ discovery of a Chinese information operation targeting their country’s election, Australians, too, should beware such risks.
In fact, there are already signs that Beijing is interfering in campaigning for the Australian election to be held on 3 May.
In Canada, China evidently prefers the Liberal government of Prime Minister Mark Carney to the Conservative opposition. In Australia, we are seeing messaging against Opposition Leader Peter Dutton—suggesting that Beijing wants the Labor government of Anthony Albanese to be re-elected.
The Australian Secret Intelligence Organization and the Australian Electoral Commission are cooperating to guard against China’s now well established habit of trying to shape foreign elections.
For Australian voters, especially those consuming media in languages other than English, the information environment is crowded and contested. Overtly, there are foreign official state channels (communications by foreign governments) and state-controlled outlets (those funded and editorially controlled by foreign states).
Covertly, there are attributed and non-attributed channels. Attributed channels operate under foreign state oversight without publicly disclosing affiliation. Non-attributed channels aren’t directly linked to foreign states, but are nonetheless aligned. The interwoven and reinforcing nature of these channels is part of the cause for concern, particularly as they operate outside regulatory or journalistic oversight.
Politicians usually refrain from commenting on foreign elections, though Papua New Guinea’s foreign minister this week raised eyebrows by saying he personally hoped Labor would win Australia’s. China’s interference is different to such one-off instances: it’s persistent, widespread and surreptitious.
In early April, Canada’s Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Taskforce revealed that a Chinese-language influence campaign backed by Beijing was targeting Chinese-speaking Canadians on the popular multi-function app WeChat. The messaging promoted Carney as a strong statesman, subtly framing him as a leader more capable of managing relations with the United States.
The taskforce found that the campaign originated from Youli-Youmian, a popular WeChat news account, which Canadian intelligence linked to the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission. The authorities had also picked up on the account in June 2023 and January 2025, when it targeted other members of parliament. This time the authorities found ‘coordinated inauthentic behavior’—the use of a network of accounts to amplify a narrative disguised as organic public opinion. This activity peaked in March.
