What Happened to Putin’s Friends? How Europe’s Radical Right Navigated the Ukraine Crisis on Social Media
In Germany and Italy, where Russian gas lines were critical to industrial and energy infrastructure, the AfD and Lega initially condemned Russia, but quickly shifted their attention to the futility of energy sanctions and the disproportionate damage caused to their domestic economies.
Finally, the more geographically distant French, Dutch and Belgian radical right parties offered stronger initial condemnations, but focused gradually less on the war, advocating in general for peace. Instead, they highlighted the juxtaposition between the “good” Ukrainian immigrants, of which their countries did not receive a vast quantity, and the “undeserving” migrants from elsewhere.
A War of Words About the EU
Perhaps most significantly, our research revealed that radical right parties strategically used the Ukraine crisis to reinforce their Eurosceptic credentials. Our analysis shows a 6 percent increase in negative sentiment toward the EU when these parties discussed Russia after the invasion.
Rather than blaming Russia for energy price spikes or other economic hardships, these parties consistently framed such problems as EU policy failures. They argued that European governments had made countries vulnerable through naïve energy policies, excessive reliance on Russian gas or ineffective sanctions that harmed their own citizens more than Russia.
As one Italian Lega post put it, the EU’s sanctions were “in reality harmful to the Italian people mostly”, while failing to curtail Russian aggression. Similar narratives appeared across parties, using the war as evidence of EU incompetence rather than Russian wrongdoing.
Implications for European Politics
The radical right’s strategic navigation of the Ukraine crisis offers several insights into contemporary European politics. First, it demonstrates these parties’ sophisticated communication strategies in managing potentially damaging positions. Rather than outright reversals or stubborn adherence to pro-Russia stances, they employed nuanced rhetorical techniques to shift focus from their previous positions.
Second, the consistent integration of Ukraine-related topics into anti-EU narratives shows how external crises can be repurposed to reinforce core ideological positions. While public opinion strongly supported Ukraine, radical right parties found ways to channel crisis discourse into criticism of European institutions.
Finally, this case illustrates the increasing professionalization of radical right parties, which now operate as strategic political actors rather than merely protest movements. Their ability to rapidly calibrate messaging on complex geopolitical issues reflects their evolution into sophisticated political operators.
This communication pattern appears to have paid electoral dividends. Despite their previous associations with Putin’s regime, these parties have suffered minimal electoral consequences from their Russia ties. By successfully shifting the conversation from their potentially problematic past positions to popular concerns about energy prices and inflation, they managed to avoid significant political fallout while maintaining their distinctive ideological profile.
For more information, see the authors’ accompanying paper in European Union Politics.
Chendi Wang is an Assistant Professor of Political Science in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. Argyrios Altiparmakis is a Research Fellow in the Department of Social and Political Science at the European University Institute where he works as part of the SOLID-ERC project. This article is published courtesy of EUROPPBlog, the blog of the European Institute at the London School of Economics. This article gives the views of the authors, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics.
