DRONE WARFAREUkraine Drone Strikes on Russian Airbase Reveal Any Country Is Vulnerable to the Same Kind of Attack
Air defense systems are built on the assumption that threats come from above and from beyond national borders. But Ukraine’s coordinated drone strike on 1 June on five airbases deep inside Russian territory exposed what happens when states are attacked from below and from within. In low-level airspace, visibility drops, responsibility fragments, and detection tools lose their edge. Drones arrive unannounced, response times lag, coordination breaks.
Ukrainians are celebrating the success of one of the most audacious coups of the war against Russia – a coordinated drone strike on June 1 on five airbases deep inside Russian territory. Known as Operation Spiderweb, it was the result of 18 months of planning and involved the smuggling of drones into Russia, synchronized launch timings and improvised control centers hidden inside freight vehicles.
Ukrainian sources claim more than 40 Russian aircraft were damaged or destroyed. Commercial satellite imagery confirms significant fire damage, cratered runways, and blast patterns across multiple sites, although the full extent of losses remains disputed.
The targets were strategicbomber aircraft and surveillance planes, including Tu-95s and A-50 airborne early warning systems. The drones were launched from inside Russia and navigated at treetop level using line-of-sight piloting and GPS pre-programming.
Each was controlled from a mobile ground station parked within striking distance of the target. It is reported that a total of 117 drones were deployed across five locations. While many were likely intercepted, or fell short, enough reached their targets to signal a dramatic breach in Russia’s rear-area defense.
The drone platforms themselves were familiar. These were adapted first-person-view (FPV) multirotor drones. These are ones where the operator gets a first-person perspective from the drone’s onboard camera.
These are already used in huge numbers along the front lines in Ukraine by both sides. But Operation Spiderweb extended their impact through logistical infiltration and timing.
Nations treat their airspace as sovereign, a controlled environment: mapped, regulated and watched over. Air defense systems are built on the assumption that threats come from above and from beyond national borders. Detection and response also reflect that logic. It is focused on mid and high-altitude surveillance and approach paths from beyond national borders.
But Operation Spiderweb exposed what happens when states are attacked from below and from within. In low-level airspace, visibility drops, responsibility fragments, and detection tools lose their edge. Drones arrive unannounced, response times lag, coordination breaks.
Spiderweb worked not because of what each drone could do individually, but because of how the operation was designed. It was secret and carefully planned of course, but also mobile, flexible and loosely coordinated.
The cost of each drone was low but the overall effect was high. This isn’t just asymmetric warfare, it’s a different kind of offensive capability – and any defense needs to adapt accordingly.
