DRONE WARFAREDefending U.S. Military Bases Against Drones? A Recent Tabletop Exercise Explores How
In 2016, during coalition operations against the Islamic State, defense leaders started characterizing drones, especially small-unmanned aircraft systems, as a threat to U.S. military personnel and installations. Since then, drones have proliferated and increasingly threaten military personnel and bases, both at home and abroad.
In 2016, during coalition operations against the Islamic State, defense leaders started characterizing drones, especially small-unmanned aircraft systems, as a threat to U.S. military personnel and installations. Since then, drones have proliferated and increasingly threaten military personnel and bases, both at home and abroad.
In March 2025, more than 100 participants from more than two dozen federal agencies participated in a tabletop exercise exploring aspects of counter-drone operations. This was the sixth event in a series of tabletop exercises exploring various aspects of counter-drone operations, capabilities, authorities, and threats. The most recent event was designed to explore a key research question in the homeland—how can the Joint Force and Interagency support Northern Command’s synchronization of counter-drone operations to defend military bases in the homeland?
The Joint Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office (JCO) partnered with RAND in designing hypothetical but realistic drone incursion scenarios that attempted to fulfill stakeholders’ interests without priming them to think and respond in certain ways. The scenarios drew insights from recent drone incursions at U.S. military installations. Two different sites, Fort Bliss in Texas and Joint Base Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, informed the tabletop exercise. This allowed the exercise team to vary conditions that, when considered in combination with one another, approximated the complexity of drone incursions at military bases. These included various drones flying at different bearings, altitudes, and ranges from military bases; multiple modes of transportation, from which participants could adjudicate the merits—and limits—of applying counterpositioning, navigation, and timing capabilities; and, a litany of federal, state, and local authorities, in addition to military units.
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“Since 2016, drones have proliferated and increasingly threaten military personnel and bases, both at home and abroad.”
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The JCO/RAND team explored the implications of these “treatments” in terms of three questions. First, what triggers Northern Command’s synchronization of counter-drone operations at military bases? Second, how can the Joint Force and Interagency, synchronized by Northern Command, maximize data-sharing to enhance situational awareness of drone incursions at military bases? Third, what conditions encourage the use of counterpositioning, navigation, and timing capabilities, as well as other exquisite technologies, to mitigate the effects of drone incursions at military bases? Participants addressed these questions over multiple phases of the two scenarios, and their analyses were facilitated by experts from the JCO and RAND.
