Rising Dragon, Slumbering Sam
A navy group of J-15s carrying mockups of the PL-15 long-range air-to-air missile trailed the KJ-600, and both the air force J-20 and J-35 formation and the navy J-15 and J-35 group were led by electronic attack variants of Shenyang’s family based on the Sukhoi Flanker.
Operationally, this supports a system where KJ-series aircraft using active, electronically scanned arrays (AESAs) are not just providing early warning but battle management and missile guidance support, and where heavily loaded electromagnetic-attack aircraft give up little in speed and agility to better perform their mission.
The J-20S is important because, according to Chinese commentators, among its missions is integrating drones with manned formations. The fact that the various unmanned configurations on show were recoverable—not throw-away—suggests that the Chinese military is leaning in that direction. But for China, these don’t present the same problems of deployment and sustainment that they do for the US. Not only does China have a vast land mass, but the old days massive but poorly equipped forces, including hordes of bootleg MiGs, have left it with plenty of infrastructure.
The H-6 bomber is different. The basic design is as old as the B-52, but it’s still in production—in greatly updated versions with modern systems that can carry cruise missiles or the outsize JL-1.
The trio of Y-20Bs emphasized another development: the long campaign to develop high-performance indigenous engines is bearing fruit. This has been a challenge for more than purely technical reasons: since the 1970s, year by year, Western military engines have relied more upon a massive supply chain sustained by the airline business. China hardly has a civil engine industry. But it’s making progress in military aircraft propulsion, anyway.
And as we’ve seen, innovation in China’s aerospace is accelerating. Apart from sheer resources and national commitment, there are two prime reasons for this.
One is that China’s military appears to have a good grasp on technological development. No one project has been allowed to monopolize resources, and stealth technology hasn’t been constrained to two approaches as it has in the US (the Lockheed Martin concept derived from the F-117 and the Northrop concept dating to the B-2).
Another reason springs from that. Since the 1990s there has been a wide variety of military aircraft programs in China. Even copies and upgrades provided valuable experience for the engineers who graduated during China’s emergence from Maoism and now hold responsible positions.
J-20 designer Yang Wei was appointed director of design at Chengdu at 38. He had headed development of the JF-17 fighter and worked on the J-10. And clearly he has had many talented students.
Meanwhile, the Mitchell Institute—dominated by retired USAF officers—is recommending the USAF go all-in on the decades-old F-35 design and (once again) commit to just one new fighter program, the F-47. Does that look like a good idea?
Bill Sweetman is a veteran, award-winning journalist and aerospace industry executive. He is the author of Trillion Dollar Trainwreck: How the F-35 hollowed out the US Air Force. This article is published courtesy of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI).
