Russia places orders for more than 50 Israeli UAVs

Late last year Russia began to investigate buying Israeli UAVs (see 20 November 2008 and 22 December 2008 HS Daily Wire). Now it has placed an order for more than fifty aircraft, including the Bird-Eye 400, I-View MK150, and Searcher 2.

• The Bird-Eye 400 is a nine pound micro-UAV with a maximum endurance of 80 minutes, maximum ceiling of 1,000 feet, and it can operate 15 kilometers from the operator. It is mainly for the use of small infantry units.
• The I-View MK150 is a 550 pound aircraft with an 7 hour endurance, maximum altitude of 17,000 feet, and it can operate up to 150 kilometers from the operator. It can carry a 44 pound payload, which enables day and night vidcams. It can take off using an airfield or from a truck mounted launcher. It can land on an airfield or via parachute. It is usually employed to support brigades.
• The Searcher 2 is a half ton aircraft with an endurance of 20 hours, maximum altitude of 23,000 feet, and it can operate up to 300 kilometers from the operator. It can carry a 264 pound payload. This is closer to the U.S. Predator, and usually supports a division or brigade.

StrategyPage reports that Russia has been building UAVs for several decades, but has not achieved the kind of performance found in Israeli and American UAVs. With this $50 million purchase of Israeli UAVs, the Russians get some hands-on experience with what experts regard as the best gear out there, and Russian engineers get a close look at how competitive UAVs are put together.

The United States lost interest in UAVs after Vietnam, while in Israel, work proceeded. UAVs figured prominently in the spectacular Israeli aerial victory over the Bekaa Valley during the 1982 first Lebanon war. Using UAVs in cooperation with their warplanes, Israel was able to shut down the Syrian Air Force in a few days, destroy 86 Syrian aircraft without losing a single Israeli plane. Israel pioneered the use of UAVs for real-time surveillance, electronic warfare, and decoys.

The United States eventually solved its UAV problems. With urging from Congress, the Department of Defense began to buy UAVs from Israel. The Navy bought the Israeli Pioneer UAV, which is still in use. Many of these Israeli UAVs, along some newly developed U.S. ones, were used in the 1991 Gulf War. There were not that many UAVs then, but the Army and Marines noted that the Air Force and Navy, the only services with UAVs at the time, were stingy with answering requests for recon missions. This made the ground troops aware of how they could create their own air force of UAVs. The Army and Marines were back in the UAV development business. The Predator entered service in 1995, and the rest is history.

Russia is now in a situation similar to that of the United States in the 1970s. The Russian UAVs consistently had short duration (only a few hours) and reliability problems. The preformance of the Georgian army during the short Russia-Georgia is now the butt of jokes. The war was started by hot-head Georgian president Mikhail Shakashvili, but with the exception of shelling ethnically Russian villages on South Ossetia, the Georgian army did not do much more than lay down its arms and flee in disarray in the face of the advancing Russian troops (just for good measure, many of the Georgian officers and soldiers still found time to loot the poor villagers in South Ossetia). Then one aspect of the Georgian military performance that impressed the Russian military was the use of Israel-made UAVs. This is why Russia is now buying scores of Israeli UAV (but also developing its own: see 3 February 2009 HS Daily Wire).