HazmatU.S. takes action against tank car loaders for mislabeling hazardous cargo

Published 13 February 2014

One of the charges against Montreal Maine & Atlantic Railway (MMAR), the rail carrier operating the train which exploded in the small city of Lac- Mégantic, Quebec in July 2013, was that it mislabeled the cargo, claiming it to be less hazardous than it was. The mislabeling and downgrading of the contents of the cars allowed to company to take less rigorous security measures to secure the cars without appearing to break the law. The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) is moving against other carriers who mislabel the contents of their cargo to avoid the cost of required security measures.

On 6 July 2013 an unattended 74-car freight train carrying Bakken formation crude oil ran away and derailed, resulting in the fire and explosion of multiple tank cars in the small city ofLac- Mégantic, Quebec. Forty-two people were confirmed dead with five more missing and presumed dead.

One of the charges against the rail carrier, Montreal Maine & Atlantic Railway (MMAR), was that it mislabeled the cargo, claiming it to be less hazardous than it was. The mislabeling and downgrading of the contents of the cars allowed to company to take less rigorous security measures to secure the cars without appearing to break the law.

The U.S. Department of Transportation(DOT) has issued the first enforcement actions against North Dakota tank car loaders for wrongfully classifying Bakken crude oil. The fines, totaling $93,000, were issued against Hess Corporation, Whiting Oil and Gas Corporation, and Marathon Oil Corporation.

The fines resulted from “Operation Classification,” in which the DOT’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration(PHMSA) conducted unannounced inspections of crude loading facilities in North Dakota after the 5 July 2013 oil train explosion at Lac-Mégantic, Quebec.

“Beginning in August to Nov. 1, 2013, PHMSA inspectors tested samples from various points along the crude oil transportation chain: from cargo tanks that deliver crude oil to rail loading facilities, from storage tanks at the facilities, and from the pipeline connecting the storage tank to the railcar that would move the crude across the country,” said DOT. “Based on the test results, 11 of the 18 samples taken from cargo tanks delivering crude oil to the rail loading facilities were not assigned to the correct Packing Group.”

Railway Agereports that PHMSA fined Whiting Oil and Gas $12,000 for allegedly downgrading medium-risk Packing Group II oil received by truck to low-risk Packing Group III before loading it into rail cars. Hess Corporation was fined $51,350 for down-classifying high-risk Packing Group I crude to medium-risk Packing Group II for rail shipment. Marathon Oil was fined $30,000 for down-classifying oil received as Packing Group I to Packing Group II.  Proper classification is essential to safe shipment and handling.

“Shipping crude oil — or any hazardous material — without proper testing and classification could result in material being shipped in containers that are not designed to safely store it, or could lead first responders to follow the wrong protocol when responding to a spill,” said DOT.

The DOT’s charges and fines follow a U.S. bankruptcy court action by the trustee for the former Montreal Maine & Atlantic Railway (MMAR), which operated the Lac-Mégantic, in a suit against the oil broker, transloader, and tank car provider. Had the cargo of the Lac-Mégantic train been accurately classified, the railroad would have handled the train in a manner fitting for its contents, thereby avoiding the runaway derailment.

“The shipping documents provided by Defendants identified the train’s entire cargo of crude oil as a Class 3 flammable liquid having a high flash point — the temperature at which organic material gives off sufficient vapors to ignite — and, hence, a low danger,” states the action filed 30 January in the Maine division of the federal bankruptcy court. “These representations were false. On the contrary, tests conducted after the derailment have confirmed that the crude oil had a dangerously low flash point and was highly volatile.”

On 4 February 2014, PHMSA reported that “as a result of today’s findings, PHMSA has expanded the scope of Operation Classification to include testing for other factors that affect proper characterization and classification, such as Reid Vapor Pressure, corrosivity, hydrogen sulfide content, and composition/concentration of the entrained gases in the material.” By PHMSA extending its enforcement initiatives, the agency is issuing classification requirements that may be unspecified in current regulations.