Trump-proofing NATO: Why Europe’s Current Nuclear Deterrents May Not Be Enough to Face Biggest Threats Since WWII
With two of the biggest superpowers being led by wildcards Putin, and potentially Trump, NATO members are rethinking their nuclear strategy. Both the UK and France have nuclear capabilities, and this provides an independent nuclear deterrence.
However, NATO’s deterrence relies mostly on US nuclear weapons deployed in Europe – of which there are about 100 non-strategic warheads (down from 7,500 in the 1980s) deployed in five NATO countries – Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey. By comparison, Russia has around 6,000 nuclear weapons – which constitutes the world’s largest arsenal – and can launch these weapons from land, sea and air.
Russian nuclear weapons are deployed across dozens of military bases in Russia, with some tactical nuclear weapons recently moved to Belarus.
Most concerning may be Russia’s confirmation in 2018 that it has nuclear-capable Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad – the Russian enclave between Poland and Lithuania.
Even though Russia’s nuclear modernization drive has not been a huge success, the Kremlin has used the threat of nuclear weapons to temper the west’s response to Russian aggression.
Can Europe Survive without the U.S.?
Though the conflict in Ukraine has made the issue of nuclear deterrence more urgent, this is not the first time European powers have voiced concerns about their own vulnerabilities. In 2020, French president Emmanuel Macron raised the alarm about the US’s commitment to NATO and offered to make France’s nuclear deterrence the center of European defense strategy.
At the time, NATO secretary-general Jens Soltenberg dismissed this suggestion, claiming that it made more strategic sense to rely on the US’s nuclear umbrella.
France and the UK are far behind Russia. France has around 290 nuclear warheads, which can be deployed at short notice, from both air and sea.
The UK decided in 2021 to increase the number of nuclear weapons to 225, with the goal of reaching 260 warheads by 2025.
Unlike Europe, the US does have a huge stockpile of nuclear weapons, just below Russia’s – at 5,244, and this includes nuclear-armed submarines, long-range bombers and inter-continental missiles. It has also been flying B-52 strategic bombers close to the Russian border in the Gulf of Finland, as a show of force to the Russians.
But a Trump presidency may give Putin the impression that he is unlikely to face any consequences for his actions from the US, which has been at the heart of NATO’s current nuclear deterrence plan. This would put more pressure on Europe to demonstrate its resolve.
Poland, for one, has made clear that it is ready and able to host nuclear weapons, while the Baltic states have upped their own military spending. Close to Kaliningrad, the Baltics have important energy and telecommunications infrastructure, making the area particularly vulnerable.
While some experts argue to increase NATO’s nuclear capabilities and sharing programs, others claim that NATO’s most significant source of deterrence comes from political unity and its advanced conventional forces.
Increasing nuclear weapons capabilities may make Russia feel more threatened, and more likely to take risks. A related view is that the war in Ukraine has proven that there is no effective nuclear deterrent. The existence of tactical nuclear weapons (of which Russia has 2,000), which are smaller and more precise, increases the likelihood that they will be used by virtue of being smaller.
Whatever course of action carries enormous risks and potential devastation. And it’s important to highlight that the nuclear weapon launched in Hiroshima in 1945 was a “small” nuclear weapon — and it still had the power to kill 140,000 people with generations later still suffering from diseases.
Modern nuclear weapons are 3,000 times more powerful. This makes it all the most critical to come up with a coherent and effective nuclear strategy that can prevent them from being used at all.
Natasha Lindstaedt is Professor, Department of Government, University of Essex. This articlei s published courtesy of The Conversation. (under Creative Commons-Attribution / No derivative)
