Syria After Assad: What to Know About HTS, Hezbollah, and Iran
The rebel victory in Syria, led by HTS, thus poses an existential threat to Hezbollah. First, Hezbollah has lost its immensely important overland lifeline that ran from Iran through Syria to Lebanon. HTS will likely staunch the flow of Iranian weaponry and other materiel, as well as impede the ability of Iran’s Islamist Revolutionary Guard Corps and Quds Force advisors to continue to sustain and support Hezbollah. Second, Israel’s Air Force has reportedly already struck Iranian missile facilities in Damascus that had nourished Hezbollah’s previously formidable array of long-, medium-, and short-range missiles and rockets. Finally, with Hezbollah already severely weakened by Israel and now more geographically isolated from Iran, its myriad opponents in Lebanon, after four decades, could be emboldened to move against it and curtail its power and influence over Lebanon once and for all.
How much is this a turning point for Iran’s “axis of resistance”?
The loss of Syria as an ally as a base of operations, and perhaps as the most critical node in Iran’s “axis of resistance,” coupled with the likely neutering of Hezbollah, will further isolate Tehran and undermine its ability to use proxies to project power and influence throughout the region. Israel has already systematically dismantled the leadership and operational infrastructures of two out of three of Iran’s main catspaws in the Middle East (Hamas and Hezbollah). This leaves only the Houthis, situated far afield on the southern flank of the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen, as Iran’s only proxy with any kind of serious offensive capabilities.
What does Assad’s fall mean for Hezbollah’s political influence in Lebanon?
Hezbollah had already suffered a crushing blow with the loss of at least fifteen of its most senior leaders, including its long-time secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah. His successor and former deputy, Sayed Naim Qassem, has none of Nasrallah’s charisma, much less combat experience and battle leadership. It is unlikely that Qassem has the authority or ability to lead Hezbollah out of the depths of despair it now finds itself in. All those in Lebanon who have long opposed and hated Hezbollah for its ruthless domination of the country’s politics and economy will likely seize on this opportunity to challenge its decades-long primacy.
What should Israel and the United States be doing in the coming days and weeks in Syria?
The United States, first and foremost, should ensure the security and protection of its nine hundred or so military personnel stationed at the al-Tanf garrison in eastern Syria along the border with Iraq. Second, and just as critical, is continuing to support our Kurdish allies in the Syrian Democratic Forces, who are currently under assault by Turkey’s Syrian proxy, the Syrian National Army. This clash between the local allies of two key North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states is one of the ironies of the Syrian civil war and underscores its complexity and volatility.
Third, the United States, France, and other European countries should immediately earmark and prioritize greater assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces. This urgent enhancement of their capabilities is needed to enable Lebanon’s legal, duly constituted armed forces to fill the vacuum of security left by Hezbollah’s weakening and to better defend the territorial integrity and internal security of Lebanon against potential threats from HTS, ISIS, and other Syrian-based jihadi terrorist groups.
As for Israel, the Israel Defense Forces have already seized the strategically vital Mount Hermon and strategic towns and villages in the territory along the border with Syria to ensure that rebel jihadi forces cannot threaten Israel. The Israeli Air Force will likely continue its air strikes to prevent military assets, including chemical weapons, missile technology, and intelligence, from falling into rebel hands.
Bruce Hoffman is the Shelby Cullom and Kathryn W. Davis Senior Fellow for Counterterrorism and Homeland Security. This article is published courtesy of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).This work represents the views and opinions solely of the author. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.
