Southport Attack: Changing the Definition of Terrorism Won’t Stop the Violence

It is important to note that it is really only the motive clause which prevents any murder or assault from satisfying the definition of terrorism. And even then, motive is defined so broadly as to confer vast discretion on the police, prosecution and government to pick and choose which cases to apply it to.

Plenty of acts could potentially satisfy the current definition of terrorism – including much of the rioting activity following the Southport attack. But they are not necessarily framed as such by the police or government.

Laws should be as clear as possible to help us act accordingly. Any attempt to broaden the definition in the wake of one specific incident would only increase the already heavy reliance on discretion and potentially cause further confusion as to the clarity of the law.

The Value of a Terrorism Declaration
Uncertainty over the definition of terrorism and motive may have led to the delay in police declaring the Southport attack a terrorist incident. They did so only after Rudakubana was charged with further terrorist offences.

Here we must also ask what is the purpose of changing the terrorism definition. Is it the need for police to quickly declare a terrorist incident? There may be a case for this if the declaration of a terrorist incident triggers a specific emergency response to an ongoing situation. The case is much weaker when describing an attack that has already occurred.

And if you are going to change the definition of terrorism for the purpose of declaring a terrorist incident, then why not change it for that specific purpose only?

My research contends that there does not have to be a single “one size fits all” definition of terrorism. Instead, if the state is to have counter-terrorist powers, it should use bespoke definitions of terrorism in different scenarios to try and limit decision-maker discretion as much as possible.

For instance, a broader definition could be considered for the purposes of police declaring a terrorist incident. But a narrower definition could be employed for more intrusive counter-terrorist powers or charging someone with criminal offences.

A Changing Threat
Announcing the inquiry, Starmer claimed that the UK’s terrorist threat has changed, highlighting problem of young people being radicalized online.

However, not all cases of youth radicalization are similar to the Southport attacker, with his lack of overt political motive. From Shamima Begum, who travelled to Syria to join Islamic State when she was only 15 years old, to Rhianan Rudd who was also only 15 when charged with terror offences, many of these young people can clearly be shown to satisfy the existing motive requirement.

These two cases also point to a deeper challenge in harm prevention. Charges against Rudd were dropped when evidence proved that she had been groomed online by right-wing extremists. She took her own life in May 2022 and her mother argued that she should have been viewed as a victim rather than as a criminal.

Likewise, a special immigration tribunal found that there was “credible suspicion” that Begum had also been groomed. Despite this, the tribunal upheld the home secretary’s decision to strip her of her British citizenship.

These cases reveal that we need to reconsider how we view the issue of radicalization. A key problem with the current Prevent strategy is that it is viewed with suspicion by many communities because it is seen as operating as a form of surveillance, rather than assistance. Perhaps instead we should be improving the existing safeguarding and child safety mechanisms, before making sweeping changes to terrorism law.

If counter-terrorism law is ultimately about intervening as soon as possible to prevent harm from happening, there are better ways to achieve this problem than through the draconian framework of national security.

And while we may find some satisfaction in signaling our moral outrage by adding the additional label of “terrorism” to an attack, sometimes the repugnancy of an act should be allowed to speak for itself.

Alan Greene is Reader in Constitutional Law and Human Rights, University of Birmingham. This article is published courtesy of The Conversation.