Puma Tanks Unusable: Is Germany's Military Fit for Action?
Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced a “Zeitenwende” (turning of the times) which was hailed as a sea-change in the country’s approach to foreign policy and military strategy.
To prove he meant it, Scholz announced an increase in the annual defense budget, making it the largest in all of Europe, as well asa €100-billion one-off “special fund” to modernize the military.
Blame Game
Nine months later, some are wondering where that mountain of money is.
The ammunition row sparked an ugly exchange between the government and Germany’s defense industry about who should have taken the initiative: Is it up to the industry to increase capacity first, or should the government have placed orders more quickly?
“What I now expect from the arms industry is for capacities to be built up,” Lars Klingbeil, leader of Scholz’s center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD), told ARD in early December. “But to wait and say: Let’s see what the politicians offer us — that’s not an attitude with which we can reduce these deficits.”
“If the German industry can’t manage it … then we have to see what we can buy from abroad, for example from other NATO partners,” Klingbeil added.
Hans Christoph Atzpodien, head of the German security and defense industry association BDSV, dismissed Klingbeil’s statements as “pretty wrong.” Atzpodien told the DPA news agency that major German arms companies had doubled their capacities in the weeks after the war in Ukraine began.
“It’s ridiculous this theater that is being played out between the defense industry and the government,” Rafael Loss, a defense analyst at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), told DW.
Loss pointed out that regulations are in place preventing arms companies from proactive production of weapons or asking banks for loans without a state contract.
The analyst says Germany lacks a sense of urgency in reacting to the geopolitical implications of Russia’s attack on Ukraine. “Other countries have moved much quicker, especially in Eastern Europe, in creating the relevant working groups between government and industry,” Loss said.
NATO partners in northeastern Europe have already expressed concern that Germany is not a military partner to rely on in a crisis. At a conference in Berlin in late October, Latvian Defense Minister Artis Pabriks asked his European colleagues, “We’re prepared to die, are you?” Addressing the Germans specifically, he said, “A lot will depend on the military power of your country, and, I’m sorry, your military power is currently not there.”
“To be fair to Scholz, I think his turning-of-the-times speech indicated that he is implicitly aware of this momentous challenge,” said Loss. “But it seems like the Defense Ministry and other institutions aren’t really up to the task of keeping all these balls in the air.”
Procurement Has Only Just Begun
Major new orders have been made under Scholz. Germany has signed a deal to buy 35 American-made F-35 fighter jets to replace its aging fleet of Tornados, at a cost of €200 million each. But it will take until 2027 before these are ready for use.
Military procurement is always a long process, and other Western European countries face similar problems updating their peacetime procedures. Almost everything the military uses has to be ordered and then manufactured first. “You can’t just buy certain systems off the shelf in the DIY store,” Lambrecht told the Bundestag in the parliament’s budget debate recently.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has upended everything. The stories about Germany’s ammunition shortages emerged partly because questions were raised about maintaining supplies for the weapons Germany is sending to Ukraine.
“We need roughly 15 times more ammunition to ensure a sustained supply of ammunition for the weapons provided to Ukraine, while rebuilding the German armed forces at the scope required,” said Loss.
But there are also underlying long-term issues. In the past few decades, the Bundeswehr has sold off many of its Cold War-era storage bunkers — meaning that even if it did have the NATO-stipulated 30 days’ worth of ammunition, the military would be struggling to find anywhere to keep it.
A History of Shortcomings
For that reason, defense analyst Loss thinks the criticism from the opposition conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) sounds hollow. “Things weren’t different for the last 16 years when the CDU was in power,” he said. “It’s funny seeing the SPD and the CDU blaming each other for the sad state of the German armed forces, but I think both share roughly equal blame.”
Basic supply problems have long been an issue. The Bundestag’s defense commissioner, Eva Högl, recently told Die Zeit national newspaper that German soldiers still have to train without all the necessary protective equipment, thermal underwear and other essentials.
She spoke of a combination of logistical inefficiency, a post-pandemic hangover and bureaucratic inertia. “Unfortunately, there is also sometimes indifference and apathy on the part of the responsible officials in the Bundeswehr: ‘We don’t have it, be patient, it’s not that big a deal, we’ll send it soon enough,’ that’s what the soldiers hear all the time,” Högl said.
ome bureaucratic hurdles are now being fixed: Rules are being changed so that smaller orders don’t have to go through a Europe-wide bidding process, and commanders are being allowed to spend up to €5,000 without having to go via official procurement procedures.
Still, the government has now promised that basic equipment is expected to be delivered by the end of the year. With any luck, the German soldiers will be getting their new socks in time for Christmas.
Ben Knight is a DW reporter. Andrea Grunau reports from Bavaria for DW. This article, which was edited by Rina Goldenberg, is published courtesy of Deutsche Welle (DW). This article was first published on 1 December, 2022. It has been updated and republished to reflect latest developments.
