The Israel-Hezbollah Conflict: Where It Stands
Hamas’s attack on southern Israel in October 2023. In general, the Israelis got the better of Iran in this “shadow war,” successfully assassinating Iranian nuclear scientists, disrupting Iran’s flow of weapons to Hezbollah, and penetrating Tehran’s nuclear program. Meanwhile, Iran has been supporting their network of anti-Israel proxies in the region.
The region has watched as Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, threatened a “punishing” reprisal for the assassination of Haniyeh in Tehran in early August, and as Iranian officials declared on social media that the Islamic Republic will respond at a place and time of its choosing. So while Israel and the United States may have deterred Iran for the moment, Iran will almost certainly retaliate. Still, the deployment of U.S. military power to the region combined with Israel’s own demonstrations of force have convinced the Ayatollah and leaders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps that the punishment it has promised to dole out could wind up not being worth the likely cost, so now they must rethink how to best avenge Haniyeh.
Is there any expected change to the U.S. role in bolstering Israel’s defense, as well as seeking to spur diplomacy to end the war in the Gaza Strip?
The United States has deployed considerable force to help ensure Israeli security, including two aircraft carriers and large numbers of military aircraft in the region. This show of force is intended to deter Iran and Hezbollah from escalating the conflict further. The United States is also continuing to share intelligence with Israel. If the risks of escalation diminish in the coming weeks, it is likely that the United States will reduce some of its supplemental forces.
U.S. diplomats continue to work with their Israeli, Egyptian, and Qatari counterparts on a cease-fire. They claim to be close to an agreement that everyone hopes will lead to a de-escalation across all fronts of the conflict. Yet, Hamas and the Israeli government have not been able to come to an agreement. Beyond the question of whether Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar and members of the Israeli government actually want a cease-fire, there are several important sticking points for negotiators to overcome.
The Israelis require that their forces remain in the Philadelpi Corridor, which is on the Egypt-Gaza border. There, the Israelis have found tunnels, which they credibly claim were used to resupply Hamas. The Egyptian government regards Israel’s presence in the area to be a violation of the 2005 Philadelpi Accord, under which the IDF withdrew from the corridor while Egypt established a paramilitary guard to prevent smuggling across its border with Gaza. The Israelis also want to retain access to the east-west Netzarim Corridor, which bisects the Gaza Strip. Hamas, however, demands that all Israeli forces withdraw from the enclave. The other major question remains over whether or not Hamas is willing to satisfy Israel’s demands on the number of hostages to be released as part of an initial phase of a cease-fire.
Steven A. Cook is Eni Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa Studies and Director of the International Affairs Fellowship for Tenured International Relations Scholars. This articleis published courtesy of the Council on Foreign Relations(CFR).
